Colorado Case Laws
Click on the below to read Colorado Case Laws for the following years:
2012
2011
2009
2008
2006
2005
Colorado Bail Case Law 2012
Colorado Division of Insurance v. Trujillo, 2012 WL 1036066 (Colo.App. March 29, 2012) affirmed revocation and refusal to renew Mr. Trujillo’s bail bond agent and insurance producer licenses. In December, 2004 the mother (Ms. Espinoza) of the defendant (Ted Espinoza) gave Mr. Trujillo $3,500 to use to obtain release of Ted Espinoza. He gave her a receipt written on the back of his business card. The actual source of the money was Connie Cordova (Ms. Cordova). Mr. Trujillo was unable to arrange the bond, and he used $1,140 to bail out a different friend of Ms. Cordova and returned the balance to Ms. Cordova. Ms. Espinoza wrote the division complaining that Mr. Trujillo did not return the money to her. In March, 2009 the Division filed a complaint against Mr. Trujillo and denied his application to renew his licenses. After administrative proceedings resulted in revocation of his licenses, Mr. Trujillo appealed.
The Court found that Mr. Trujillo owed Ms. Espinoza a fiduciary duty and was obligated to return the entire $3,500 to her when he was not able to post the bond for her son. The Court reasoned that Mr. Espinoza was the “insured” and Ms. Espinoza was his agent. When Mr. Trujillo was not able to obtain a bond for Mr. Espinoza, the money had to be returned to the insured’s agent who had delivered it, i.e. to Ms. Espinoza. The bail agent is not in a position to determine the true ownership of the money. The Court stated, “In summary, neither the statutes not regulations require bail bonding agents to determine the source of consideration paid to them to post a bond or to return money to a source other than the individual who entrusted the money to the bonding agent.” [The Court ignored the fact that here the agent knew the true source of the money and applied it as she directed. There is a difference between a duty to ascertain the true owner of the money and acting on that knowledge when the agent already has it.]
Colorado Case Law 2011
In Trinen v. City of Aurora, Case No. 11-cv-152 (D.Colo. August 9, 2011) an acquitted defendant sued to recover the $50 administrative bail bond fee charged by the City. She argued that the fee violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment. The court granted summary judgment to the City. The fee was an administrative cost not a cost of prosecution, and the fee was rationally related to the cost of operating the bail bond system.
Oram v. People, 2011 WL 3276190 (Colo. August 1, 2011) (En Banc), modified on reconsideration the opinion reported at 2011 WL 2150756 (Colo. May 16, 2011)(En Banc), but reached the same conclusion that there is no common law bonding agent’s privilege in Colorado and that the use of a ruse, claiming to be police officers, was evidence the bounty hunters knew they were not entitled to enter the premises. The Court seems to have made slight changes to the part of the opinion finding that there was no consent for the entry into the defendant’s brother’s house.
In Oram v. People, Case No. 09SC224 (Colo. May 16, 2011) (En Banc) two bounty hunters forced their way into premises which the defendant had listed as his residence but where he, in fact, did not reside. They briefly detained one of the inhabitants. Witnesses testified that the bounty hunters identified themselves as police officers. The bounty hunters were convicted of second degree burglary and felony menacing. The Court held that there is no common law bonding agent’s privilege in Colorado and that the use of a ruse, claiming to be police officers, was evidence the bounty hunters knew they were not entitled to enter the premises. The Court affirmed the convictions.
Colorado Case Law 2009
In People v. Chavarria-Sanchez, 2008 WL 540624 (Colo.App. March 5, 2009) the Court construed a 2007 statute, §16-3-503 C.R.S. 2008, that addressed bail for persons illegally present in the United States. The statute provided that if the defendant is deported, the court will return the documents signed by the bail agent and the bail agent will surrender the fees received. In effect, if the bond was provided by a commercial surety, deportation of the defendant does not cause forfeiture of the bond amount. Instead, the bond transaction is rescinded, and the state gets the fees paid by or on behalf of the defendant. The Court held that returning the surety’s documents meant there could be no forfeiture of the bond, but it also held that the statute did not apply retroactively. Since the bond was posted and the defendant failed to appear before June 1, 2007, when the statute took effect, the surety was not entitled to relief. A dissent argued that the statute was procedural and should have been applied retroactively.
Colorado Case Law 2008
In People v. Rickman, 178 P.3d 1202 (Colo. 2008) the defendant, while released on bond, tried to purchase a firearm. In doing so, he lied on the purchase application and eventually pled guilty to a federal felony for making the false statement. He was also convicted in state court of two counts of violating conditions of his bail bond, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the State appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals as to one count but reversed as to the other.When the defendant was released, the court did not set the conditions of his bail. The pretrial services agency set the conditions by checking boxes on a form approved by the court. Although the trial court had authority to set the conditions, it could not delegate its authority to the pretrial services agency. Therefore, the conditions which he violated, to not possess firearms and to not commit a felony, could not be imposed by the pretrial services agency. However, the prohibition on committing a felony was also a condition of his release by statute. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that he could not be convicted of violating the conditions of his bail by possessing the firearm but could be convicted based on committing a felony.
Colorado Case Law 2006
People v. Diaz-Garcia, 159 P.3d 679 (Colo.App. 2006) held that the surety was not entitled to relief from a judgment forfeiting the bond. The defendant fled to Mexico, and the United States refused to permit him to re-enter the U.S. The Court held that §16-4-108, C.R.S. exonerating the surety if the defendant was incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction did not entitle the surety to relief because it did not apply to compensated sureties and did not grant post judgment relief. The Court thought that the applicable statute was §16-4-112, which authorizes relief from a judgment of forfeiture “if it appears that justice so requires.” The Court reviewed the equitable factors to be considered and concluded that they did not favor relief from the judgment. The Court stated, “Surety here is seeking to carve out a blanket exception to bond liability for illegal aliens who flee the country and fail to appear in court. The risk of such flight is, however, assumed by sureties when they post bail for illegal aliens.”
Colorado Case Law 2005
People of the State of Colorado v. Hoover, 2005 WL 674642 (Colo. App. March 24, 2005) held that a post-conviction bond pending appeal can be “cash only.” The defendant was convicted of multiple counts of securities fraud and sentenced to 100 years in prison. He applied for bond pending appeal, and the trial court set it at $1 million cash only. He asked the appellate court to allow a $1 million surety bond. The Court held that the constitutional right to bail applied only prior to conviction and that release on bond pending appeal was purely a question of statute. The statute gave the trial court considerable discretion to deny bail or to set conditions including personal recognizance, security by cash or deposit of property or security by an approved surety. The trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion and was affirmed.
Fullerton v. County Court, 2005 WL 1038988 (Colo. App. April 5, 2005) held that a “cash only” bond was within the trial court’s discretion under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. The court discussed cases interpreting “sufficient sureties” under various state constitutions and held that “with such sufficient sureties and in such sum as such judge deems proper” in §16-19-117(1), C.R.S. gave the trial court discretion to require a “cash only” bond.
In People v. Escalera, 121 P.3d 306 (Colo. App. 2005) the defendant appeared once and failed to appear for a second hearing because he was in jail in another county. Before the trial date, the other county turned him over to INS, which deported him. When he failed to appear for trial, the court forfeited the bond, later entered judgment on the forfeiture and denied the surety’s motion to set the judgment aside. The applicable Colorado statute, §16-4-112, C.R.S., authorizes setting such a judgment aside “if it appears that justice so requires.” The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion and ordered the judgment set aside. The Court noted that the surety had no reason to know the defendant was in the United State illegally and that an arm of the state, the other county sheriff, played a role in the deportation by turning the defendant over to INS.