Washington Case Laws
Click on the below to read Washington Case Laws for the following years:
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2005
2004
Washington Case Law 2011
Regan v. McLachlan, Case No. 40152-5-II (Wash.App. August 16, 2011) involved the same underlying transaction as State v. Cruz, 2008 WL 2811270 (Wash.App. July 22, 2008) (Cruz). The bond was forfeited, and the surety company paid the forfeiture. The accompanying letter and the check itself requested that any remission be sent directly to the surety. The bail agent returned the defendant to custody, and the clerk remitted the forfeiture to the agent. In Cruz the Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction in the criminal case to order the bail agent to return the payment. In this case, an assignee of the surety sued the agent, the County and others in a civil action. The appeal involved only the County. The Court held that the County was protected from civil liability because the clerk had qualified judicial immunity for returning the money pursuant to a court order. The Court rejected the County’s alternative argument that the Cruz decision barred the civil suit under collateral estoppel. The parties and issue were different, and collateral estoppel did not apply.
Washington Case Law 2010
In State v. Watts, 2010 WL 2011541 (Wash.App. May 20, 2010) the defendant was convicted and posted a bond to remain free pending appeal. The court required two sureties on the bond, or two bonds, per RCW 10.73.040 which stated that for post conviction bonds the court will set the amount and the bond will be executed “by at least two sureties.” The defendant argued that under Criminal Rule 3.2(b) the court was required to release him on the least restrictive alternative including a bond with sufficient sureties. The Court of Appeals held that the Rule controlled, the trial court erred in thinking it had to require two sureties, and the trial court had discretion under the Rule to require one or more sureties. The Court also affirmed the defendant’s conviction and so remanded the case for his incarceration.
Washington Case Law 2009
In State v. Kramer, 2009 WL 3857419 (Wash. November 19, 2009) the defendant failed to appear on December 19, and the court ordered forfeiture of the bond. The surety did not apply for a stay of the forfeiture judgment. The Sheriff’s Department took the defendant into custody on December 26. The surety’s agent had been in contact with the defendant and urged him to surrender but did not inform the police of the defendant’s location. In a 5-4 decision, the majority of the Court held that if the defendant was recovered within 60 days of failing to appear, the surety was virtually always entitled to remission of the forfeiture. The majority thought that RCW 10.19.105 allowing the trial court to vacate the bond forfeiture if the defendant was produced in court within 60 days was not contingent on the surety having sought a stay and given a supersedeas bond under RCW 10.19.100. The Court, therefore, reversed the trial court and vacated the judgment.
The four judge dissent would have conditioned relief under 10.19.105 on first securing a stay and posting a supersedeas bond under 10.19.100, which the surety here did not do. Since the surety also did not participate in recovering the defendant, it was not entitled to relief under RCW 10.19.140. Thus, the dissenting judges thought the surety’s only avenue for relief was the equitable power of the trial court, and under the facts of the case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing equitable relief. All nine judges agreed, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in creating a novel balancing test for partial remissions. See, 2007 WL 4200109 (Wash.App. November 29, 2007).
Washington Case Law 2008
In State v. Cruz, 2008 WL 2811270 (Wash.App. July 22, 2008) the bond was forfeited, and the surety company paid the forfeiture. The accompanying letter and the check itself requested that any remission be sent directly to the surety. The bail agent, an LLC, returned the defendant to custody, and the clerk remitted the forfeiture to the agent. The surety then filed a motion in the criminal case asking the court to order the agent and/or its owner as an individual to return the money to the clerk. The individual owner objected, but the court ordered that the money be returned. The owner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the court in the criminal proceeding had no jurisdiction since there was no contention that the forfeiture or the remission were erroneous. The trial court should not have heard the surety’s motion, and the Court of Appeals vacated the order.
In State v. Garcia, 2008 WL 2955881 (Wash.App. August 4, 2008) a recovery agent went to the door of the defendant’s motel room while the recovery agent’s assistant watched the back window. A bag was thrown from the window. On the way to the police station, the defendant told the recovery agent, “I’m glad you guys aren’t cops because I had to get rid of something out the window.” The recovery agent reported this to the police who found the bag containing a large quantity of narcotics and a gun. The defendant moved to suppress his statements to the recovery agent because he had not been given a Miranda warning. The court held that the basis for the recovery agent’s custody of the defendant was contractual, the recovery agent was not a state actor, and so no Miranda warning was required.
Ranger Insurance Company v. Pierce County, 192 P.3d 886 (Wash. 2008) affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals reported at 2007 WL 1470455 (Wash.App. May 22, 2007). In a prior appeal, reported at 2004 WL 1834650 (Wash. App. August 17, 2004), the Court of Appeals remanded the case for trial to determine if the bail agent, Signature Bail Bonds, had apparent authority to direct the clerk to apply part of Ranger’s payment of the face amount of two of its bonds (one of which had not been forfeited) to satisfy forfeiture of another surety’s bonds. On remand, however, the trial court granted the clerk summary judgment based on an affidavit from another clerk that the standard of care for Washington court clerks had not been violated. The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had not decided the issues of fact articulated in the first appellate opinion and reversed the summary judgment. The Washington Supreme Court agreed and stated, “To prevail, Pierce County must prove Ranger made objective manifestations to Pierce County that caused it to subjectively and reasonably believe Signature had the authority to redirect Ranger’s funds to non-Ranger obligations.” The case was again remanded to the trial court.
Washington Case Law 2007
Ranger Insurance Company v. Pierce County, 2007 WL 1470455 (Wash.App. May 22, 2007) is a second appeal in this case. In the first appeal, reported at 2004 WL 1834650 (Wash. App. August 17, 2004), the Court remanded the case for trial to determine if the bail agent, Signature Bail Bonds, had apparent authority to direct the clerk to apply part of Ranger’s payment of the face amount of two of its bonds (one of which had not been forfeited) to satisfy forfeiture of another surety’s bonds. On remand, however, the trial court granted the clerk summary judgment based on an affidavit from another clerk that the standard of care for Oregon court clerks had not been violated. The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had not decided the issues of fact articulated in the first appellate opinion and again remanded the case.
In State v. Kramer, 2007 WL 4200109 (Wash.App. November 29, 2007) the defendant failed to appear on December 19, and the court ordered forfeiture of the bond. The defendant promptly contacted the surety’s agent with an excuse for not appearing and said he would turn himself in after Christmas. The agent did not inform the police of the defendant’s location or take any action to recover him. The police arrested the defendant on December 26, without any help from the surety or its agent, and the surety moved to exonerate the forfeiture other than for any costs or expenses incurred by the Government. The trial court offered to hold a hearing, but the surety declined and relied on the affidavit of the agent and the record in the case. The trial court denied any relief because the surety did not produce the defendant or help in his apprehension. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to complete relief pursuant to R.C.W. 10.19.090. The Court agreed that it was not up to the surety to decide when the defendant should obey the court’s order and the surety effectively collaborated with the defendant. The Court also, however, thought that the trial court should have weighed a series of factors, none of which were in the record of the case, to decide whether a partial remission was equitable, and remanded the case for a balancing of the relevant factors and determination of whether to grant partial exoneration of the bond.
Washington Case Law 2005
In State v. Surety Bankers Insurance Co., 2005 WL 583404 (Wash. App. March 14, 2005) the defendant was not apprehended in the 60 day period following forfeiture, and the surety paid the forfeiture. A few days later, the defendant was arrested on a new charge. The surety played no part in the arrest. The trial court refused to remit any of the forfeiture. The surety did not meet the statutory requirement for relief because it was not directly responsible for producing the defendant. It argued that the court nevertheless had discretion to grant relief on equitable grounds. The government argued that the statute foreclosed such equitable relief. The Court of Appeals held that it did not need to reach the issue of whether equitable relief was possible because the trial court exercised its discretion and was within its discretion in denying the relief requested by the surety.
Washington Case Law 2004
In Ranger Insurance Company v. Pierce County, 2004 WL 1834650 (Wash. App. August 17, 2004) Ranger wrote two separate bonds for a defendant named Rogers. The bail agent on both was Signature Bail Bonds, Inc. owned by Ray Hrdlicka. Signature also wrote a bond for Rogers, and two bonds for another defendant, with Granite State Insurance Co. as the surety. One of Ranger’s bonds for Rogers was forfeited along with Granite’s bonds. Signature issued checks to pay the forfeitures but then called Ranger and said that it did not have the funds to pay and that both of Ranger’s bonds had been forfeited. Ranger paid the Clerk the face amount of its two bonds — $35,000, and Signature stopped payment on its checks. The Signature manager (James Barbieri) told the Clerk to apply the $35,000 to pay the forfeited Ranger bond ($15,000) and the forfeited Granite bonds. After the defendants were recovered, Signature had the forfeitures set aside and told the Clerk that it had paid the forfeitures (using copies of the checks it stopped payment on as evidence) and the Clerk refunded the money to Signature. Signature did not send any of it to Ranger.Ranger sued the Clerk for negligence in applying the payment (which Ranger had designated for the cases on which it was surety) to the Granite bonds and for returning its money to Signature. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Clerk on the theories that Signature was Ranger’s agent and could direct how the payment was to be applied and receive the refunds on Ranger’s behalf and that the Clerk had quasi-judicial immunity for negligent acts.
The Court of Appeals held that Signature had no actual authority to apply Ranger’s money to Granite’s obligation and that there were material issues of fact as Signature’s apparent authority. It also held that the Clerk was acting in a ministerial capacity and was not protected by quasi-judicial immunity. It vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case. A dissenting judge would have affirmed the trial court.