Florida Case Laws
Click on the below to read Florida Case Laws for the following years:
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
Florida Case Laws 2012
In Ramirez v. State, 2012 WL 1889282 (Fla.App. May 25, 2012) the defendant had a felony conviction when she took a clerical job working for a bail bond agency. She was convicted of violating §648.44(8), Florida Statutes, which makes it a third degree felony for a person convicted of certain offenses to be employed by a bail bond agency. The defendant appealed arguing that a mens rea requirement should be read into the statute. That is, that she could be convicted only if she knowingly violated the statute. The Court held that the statute would be unconstitutional without the mens rea requirement and accordingly read it into the statute. The Court noted that the statute made the employer guilty of only a knowing violation, and stated, “Absent a knowledge element for the employee, this statute simply criminalizes what is otherwise innocent conduct, i.e., working at a clerical job.” The Court reversed the conviction and remanded to give the state an opportunity to try to prove the defendant possessed the required mens rea.
Florida Case Law 2011
In Tishner v. Cameron, 2011 WL 5964569 (Fla.App. November 30, 2011) the defendant failed to appear for arraignment in a violation of probation proceeding. The trial court forfeited his bond and issued a warrant. Following his subsequent arrest, the defendant brought a habeas corpus proceeding. The defendant argued that prior to the arraignment date he had filed a written waiver of arraignment and plea of not guilty and that pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.160(a) he was, therefore, not required to appear for arraignment. The Court agreed and found that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying the court to require his presence and neither the defendant nor his attorney were advised he had to appear in spite of the waiver under Rule 360(a). The Court ordered his release. Although this was a habeas corpus proceeding not an action for relief from the bond forfeiture, if he was not required to appear there would seem to be no basis on which to forfeit the bond.
In Singh Bail Bonds v. Brock, 2011 WL 5252736 (Fla.App. November 4, 2011) the surety posted bonds totaling $350,000. The defendant, a citizen of Argentina, was supposed to surrender his passport but did not. After a suppression motion was denied, the defendant fled to Argentina. The bail agent located him there, but the Argentine authorities refused to arrest him and the U.S. authorities did not seek extradition. The surety moved to set aside the forfeiture and appealed after it was denied. The forfeiture had not been paid, and the Court thought §903.27(5), Fla. Stats., required payment as a precondition to relief. Nevertheless, the trial court “heard the motion on its merits and, upon substantial, competent evidence, denied the motion.” The Court affirmed without explaining the substance of the surety’s arguments or why they were unpersuasive. The Court stated in a footnote, “Although we have not discussed in this opinion all the grounds upon which Singh and Sum have argued for reversal, we have found no merit in any of them.”
Florida Case Law 2010
STATE of Florida, et al., Petitioners, v. Arthur BLAIR, Supreme Court of Florida, June 3, 2010, 39 So.3d 1190.Click on the following link for the full case, Florida Case Law.
In American Bankers Insurance Co. v. State, 2010 WL 3927238 (Fla.App. October 8, 2010) the surety appealed a forfeiture judgment. Prior to the forfeiture, the trial court had reinstated the bond without the surety’s permission. The Court of Appeal reversed the forfeiture judgment and remanded with directions to discharge the bond. The Court noted that the reinstatement violated §903.31(2), Florida Statutes, and that the County Clerk had not opposed the surety’s trial court motion to set aside the forfeiture and did not participate in the appeal.
Florida Case Law 2009
In Matt Howard Bail Bonds v. Escambia County Clerk of Court, 2009 WL 1425215 (Fla.App. May 22, 2009) the defendant was originally charged with one first degree felony and one third degree felony. After the bond was issued, and without the surety’s consent, an amended information added a second first degree felony. The Court held that the additional charge increased the surety’s risk and the trial court should have set aside estreature of the bond.
In Stewart v. Brooks, 2009 WL 3256437 (M.D.Fla. October 7, 2009) the bond principal sued a bounty hunter, bail agent and surety company pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that the bounty hunter’s actions violated the principal’s civil rights. The court dismissed the case because the bounty hunter was not a state actor for purposes of the statute.
Florida Case Law 2008
In Rusty Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Clerk of Circuit Court, Monroe County, 2008 WL 451784 (Fla.App. January 22, 2008) the Court dismissed the appeal because there was neither a final judgment of forfeiture nor payment of the amount of the bond. The dismissal was without prejudice to permit the bail agent to file another appeal after it satisfies one of these preconditions.
In Continental Heritage Insurance Co. v. State, 981 So.2d 583 (Fla.App. 2008) the First District Court of Appeal held that the 72 hour notice to the surety of the defendant’s required appearance did not need to state that the defendant’s appearance was required. The notices were timely sent and stated the date, time and place scheduled for the defendants’ arraignments, but they did not explicitly say that the defendants were required to be present. The defendants failed to appear, and the court forfeited the bonds. Section 903.26(b), Florida Statutes, states that a bail bond can be forfeited only if the clerk gave the surety at least 72 hours notice “before the time of the required appearance of the defendant.” The Court held that “The failure of the notice to specifically state that the defendants’ presence was required does not render it defective.” The Court certified that its holding conflicted with two contrary decisions of the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
In State ex rel. Gardner v. Allstar Bail Bonds, 983 So.2d 1218 (Fla.App. 2008) the defendant failed to appear and the surety paid the forfeiture. Approximately 15 months later, the surety learned that the defendant had died. The surety sought partial remission of the forfeiture. The trial court granted a 50% remission, which the surety would have been entitled to if it had located and returned the defendant. The State appealed. The issue was whether the defendant’s death, which made it impossible to return him to custody, justified granting partial remission of the forfeiture. The record showed that the surety diligently attempted to locate him, and that the delay did not thwart the State’s prosecution other than the obvious fact that it could no longer prosecute him once he was deceased.
In a 2 to 1 decision, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that no remission should have been granted. The surety did not return the defendant, the State did not obstruct the surety’s efforts, and therefore the surety was not entitled to remission under the statute. The dissenting Justice emphasized that the bond was a contract between the State, the surety, and the defendant, the statute was read into that contract, and the statute gave the surety a right to partial remission if it retuned the defendant within two years. Since his death (treated as an Act of God) made the surety’s performance impossible, it was entitled to relief.
In Continental Heritage Insurance Co. v. State, 990 So.2d 610 (Fla.App. 2008) the defendant failed to appear at his arraignment and the bond was estreated. At the arraignment the state also filed an additional felony charge. The surety argued that the additional charge increased the surety’s risk without its consent and exonerated the bond. The Court recognized that in a proper case an additional charge could discharge the surety, but in this case the new charge was filed after the defendant had already failed to appear. There was no evidence that the defendant knew of the new charge, and the Court affirmed estreature of the bond.
Florida Case Law 2007
In State v. Sunshine State Bail Bonds, Inc., 967 So.2d 1084 (Fla.App. 2007) the defendant failed to appear for trial and a notice of forfeiture was filed. The surety paid the forfeiture. Six months later, the defendant was shot and killed by law enforcement authorities in another state. The trial court granted the surety an 80% remission, and the State appealed. The Court of Appeals held that no remission was justified under §908.23, Florida Statutes. The Court recognized that the defendant’s death made it impossible for the surety to return him to Florida and surrender him for trial, but the court relied on cases denying relief when other circumstances prevented the return of the defendant. The Court stated, “the doctrine of impossibility of performance does not excuse [the surety] of its obligation to take precautionary action to prevent [defendant] from leaving the jurisdiction, even though the actions of a third party prevented it from bringing [defendant] back to the jurisdiction.”
Florida Case Law 2006
In Universal Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 929 So.2d 697 (Fla.App. 2006) the court conditioned release of the defendant on electronic monitoring by the Miami-Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department and a $100,000 bond. The bond, however, was conditioned only on appearance and did not mention electronic monitoring. Within a few days of release, the defendant removed the electronic monitoring device and absconded, but the Department neglected to tell the court or the bail agent for over a month. The defendant did not appear and the bond was forfeited. The surety argued that the bond was discharged because the Department’s failure to notify the court or the agent that the defendant had absconded altered the terms of the bail contract to the prejudice of the surety. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The Court held that the bond contract remanded custody of the defendant to the surety and made the surety responsible for the defendant’s appearance. The Department’s failure in its independent duty to the court did not interfere with the surety’s custody or control of the defendant.
Curleycan Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 933 So.2d 122 (Fla.App. 2006) denied relief to the surety. The defendant fled to Venezuela, which refused to extradite him. The Court thought that the surety ran the risk the defendant would flee and should have taken precautions to keep him in Florida.
Florida Case Law 2005
Fast Release Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 895 So.2d 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) was a 2 to 1 opinion affirming forfeiture of several bonds. The defendant failed to appear for a scheduled hearing, and the court estreated [the Florida word for forfeited] the bonds and issued a “no bond” capias [bench warrant?] for the defendant. The sureties, however, had not been given proper notice of the hearing, and the trial court set aside the estreature, noticed another hearing, but refused to cancel the capias. The defendant again failed to appear and the court estreated the bonds for the second time. The sureties argued that the defendant fled when he learned of the “no bond” capias and that their bonds should be exonerated because the court interfered with their control over the defendant by refusing to cancel the capias. The majority disagreed and held that the capias was correctly issued when the defendant, who had been properly noticed, failed to appear at the first hearing and that the defendant’s decision to flee was his own and not attributable to the capias. The dissenting judge would have exonerated the bonds because the prospect of pre-trial incarceration represented by the no bond capias materially increased the risk that the defendant would flee.
Roche Surety and Casualty Co., Inc. v. Department of Financial Services, Office of Insurance Regulation, 895 So.2d 1139 (Fla. App. 2005) reversed the Department’s fine for willful failure to return a former agent’s build-up fund. The surety and the former agent were engaged in litigation in the Florida Circuit Court, and the Circuit Court entered an Order that the build-up fund be held pending the outcome of that case. The Department’s administrative law judge found that the existence of the Circuit Court Order meant that the surety’s refusal to return the build-up fund was not a “willful” violation of §648.29, Fla. Stat. The Department re-classified that finding as a conclusion of law and disregarded it. There was a delay of several months between the hearing in the Circuit Court (at which the former agent consented to the holding of the build-up fund) and the Circuit Court’s entry of its written Order. The Department imposed a fine based on the proposition that retaining the build-up fund during this delay period, i.e. prior to entry of the written Order, was a willful violation. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that willfulness was a question of fact on which the Department was bound by the administrative law judge’s finding.
Surety v. State, 894 So.2d 301 (Fla. App. 2005) in a one paragraph decision reversed estreature of the bond because the surety was not given the 72 hour notice of the defendant’s appearance as required by section 903.26(1)(b), Fla. Stats.
Monroe County Bail Bonds v. State, 2004 WL 3262883 (Fla. Cir. Ct. December 6, 2004) is an opinion from a Florida Circuit Court (which is probably why it is dated in 2004 but only now reaching Westlaw). The defendant failed to appear, but the surety located him in Virginia. The state refused to issue a warrant for his arrest outside of Florida. The government and the surety agreed to a stipulated order to set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. The county court refused to enter the order. The surety appealed to the circuit court which held that payment of the forfeiture was a precondition to relief, that even if the forfeiture was paid, relief could only be granted if the motion was brought before the judge within 60 days after the notice of forfeiture was mailed. The court also thought that the surety could not be entitled to remission of any part of the forfeited amount since it had not paid the forfeiture and that no remission was due based on the mere fact that the defendant was outside of Florida unless there was proof the surety had seized him but could not have him returned to Florida because of the state’s limit on the warrant. This decision seems to be one judge’s explanation of how he thinks sections 903.26, 903.27 and 903.28, Fla. Stats., ought to work.
In Mike Snapp Bail Bonds v. Orange County, 913 So.2d 88 (Fla. App. 2005) the bail agent did what the statute required for remission of the forfeiture. The defendant was recovered thirteen days after the forfeiture notice, and the bail agent paid the costs to return the defendant. The state admitted that the prosecution was not hindered. The trial court nevertheless refused to remit the forfeiture because there was no proof in the court file that the transportation costs were paid. The bail agent paid the forfeiture and sought rehearing on remission of the forfeiture. The trial court again denied relief, and the bail agent appealed. The Court held that the statute does not require the surety to have filed a receipt or proof of payment of transportation costs to be entitled to remission of the forfeiture (the State did not contest that the transportation costs actually were paid, and the bail agent had a letter to that effect from the sheriff). The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case with directions that the amount forfeited plus interest be returned to the bail agent.
Florida Case Law 2004
In Carr v. Lammie, 2004 WL 507570 (Fla. 2ndDCA March 17, 2004) a defendant was recovered and $28,500 of the forfeited bond proceeds remitted. The seller and purchaser of the bail bond agency both claimed the right to receive the money. The surety had been reimbursed in part from the agency’s build up fund and in part from the purchase price of the agency. The surety did not claim the remitted money for itself. The Court held that the right to receive the money was an asset of the agency transferred to the purchaser along with the other agency assets.
In Integrity Bail Bonds v. Pinellas County Board of County Commissioners, 2004 WL 784734 (Fla. App. April 14, 2004) the State, after the bond was written, increased the offense charged from a third degree felony to a second degree felony. The Court held that this change, which increased the potential maximum sentence from 5 years to 15 years, was a substantial change that increased the likelihood the defendant would abscond. Therefore, the bond was discharged, and the trial court erred in not setting aside the forfeiture (“estreature”) entered after the defendant failed to appear. The Court rejected the County’s argument that the surety had a duty to object after receiving notice of the increased charge.
Green v. Abony Bail Bond, 316 F. Supp.2d 1254 (M.D. Fla. 2004) is a suit for personal injuries allegedly inflicted by agents and employees of the surety and bail agent in the process of recovering the bond principal who had “inadvertently failed to appear.” The case was filed in federal court on the theory that the actions of the defendants violated the plaintiffs’ civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. The court dismissed the case without prejudice to re-filing in state court because the defendants were not “state actors” for purposes of §1983.
In A-Alternative Release Bail Bonds v. Martin County, 882 So.2d 414 (Fla. App. 2004) the defendant was arrested for simple cocaine trafficking for which the mandatory minimum sentence is 5 years. The prosecutor filed an information charging him with trafficking in an amount greater than 400 grams which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. Neither the bail agent nor the state official who reviewed and accepted the bond were aware of the increased charge, and the bond described the offense as “trafficking in cocaine.” The Court reversed an order escheating the bond because the offense for which the defendant failed to appear was significantly different than the one described on the face of the bond. Although the description can be in general terms without technical detail, it cannot describe a different offense. The dissenting Judge thought the trial court should have been affirmed because the information was filed before the bond was issued and therefore “trafficking in cocaine” should be read as a general description of the 400 gram offense. Even the dissent acknowledged that if the offense were increased, without the surety’s consent, after the bond was written the bond would have been discharged. [Probably published].
Allegheny Casualty Company v. Roche Surety, Inc., 885 So.2d 1016 (Fla. App. 2004) was a dispute over a build-up fund. The bail agent involved had a fund on deposit for Allegheny’s benefit. The bail agent ceased doing business with Allegheny and entered into a contract with Roche and assigned the agent’s rights in the build-up fund to Roche. Allegheny refused to release the fund on the ground that its liability on any and all bonds had not been discharged. The trial court granted Roche summary judgment and attorneys fees. The six allegedly remaining Allegheny bonds dated from 1994 to 1997. The trial court held that any possible liability on the bonds was time barred under §903.31(1), Fla. Stats., which states that an original appearance bond expires 36 months after it is posted. Allegheny argued that the 36 month provision did not apply because it was added to the statute in 1999 after the bonds were written.
The Court of Appeals agreed that the 36 month provision did not apply retroactively. It rejected Allegheny’s arguments that the bail agent breached the contract (thus discharging any obligation to return the build-up fund) by writing bonds for another surety and by assigning the build-up fund to Roche, and that the court lacked jurisdiction because the contract said exclusive jurisdiction was in New Jersey. The Court vacated the attorneys fee award because the trial court did not follow the required procedures but indicated the trial court could revisit the issue upon remand. The case was remanded to determine whether Allegheny had any remaining bond liability.
Florida Case Law 2003
Al Estes Bonding v. Pinellas County Board of County Commissioners, 845 So.2d 254 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2003) was a procedural victory but a substantive defeat. The court held that the bondsman could pay the forfeiture and appeal without having a judgment entered against the surety. On the merits of the appeal, however, the court rejected the argument that the forfeiture should be set aside because the defendant was in federal custody, thus preventing the bondsman from producing him. There was no evidence he had been in federal custody at the time he failed to appear, and none of the statutory grounds for discharge under section 903.26(6), Fla. Stats. were met.
In Allegheny Casualty Co. v. State, 2003 WL 21749533 (Fla. 4th DCA July 30, 2003) the court refused to remit a forfeited bond. The defendant failed to appear and fled to Haiti. The surety located her there, but under the relevant treaty she allegedly could not be extradited. The court found that the surety did not meet the requirement in §903.28(2), Fla. Stat. that the surety “has substantially attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or surrender of the defendant.” The court distinguished cases in which the state refused to seek extradition after the surety located the principal in another country and noted that the defendant fled to Haiti some three months after the bond forfeiture. In effect, the court thought the surety bore a sufficient part of the blame for the failure to return the defendant that the forfeiture should not be remitted.
Section 903.28, Fla. Stats., allows remission of bail bond forfeitures if the defendant surrenders or is apprehended within 2 years of the forfeiture. The percentage of the forfeiture remitted depends on the length of time between the forfeiture and the surrender or apprehension.
In Board of Commissioners of Brevard County v. Barber Bonding Agency, 2003 WL 22213328 (Fla. 5th DCA September 26, 2003) the defendant was arrested in another county within 270 days of forfeiture but not returned to Brevard County until over one year after forfeiture. The statute provides for remission of up to 90% if apprehension is within 270 days but of up to 50% if apprehension is between one and two years after forfeiture. The court of appeals held that the date of “apprehension” is the date the defendant is taken into custody in another jurisdiction, not the date of return to custody in the jurisdiction where the bond was filed, and therefore affirmed remission of 90% of the forfeiture. The decision was by a two to one vote, and the dissenting judge suggested the issue should be certified to the Florida Supreme Court as a matter of public importance.