Pennsylvania Case Laws
Click on the below to read Pennsylvania Case Laws for the following years:
2012
2011
2010
2006
2005
2003
Pennsylvania Case Law 2012
Commonwealth v. Culver, 2012 WL 2045367 (Pa.Super. En Banc June 7, 2012) noted that the Court had granted the Commonwealth’s application to reargue these appeals and vacated the panel opinion reported at 2011 WL 2671215 (July 8, 2011). In an en banc decision with one dissent, however, the Court reached the same result as the panel opinion and reversed forfeiture of the bonds. The defendant committed a new offense while released on bail in two prior cases. The Commonwealth argued that its costs to prosecute the defendant and a co-conspirator on the new charges, including payments to the defense lawyers, should be considered “costs, inconvenience and prejudice” resulting from the defendant’s breach of the bonds. The Commonwealth admitted that it did not incur added costs in relation to the original charges. The Court agreed that the new crime was a violation of the conditions of the bonds, but held that normal costs of prosecuting the new crime were not related to the defendant’s release status and should not have been considered in determining prejudice from the breach of the bonds. The Court reversed the trial court judgment and remanded with instructions to release the bonds.
Pennsylvania Case Law 2011
In Commonwealth v. Culver, 2011 PA Super 143 (July 8, 2011) the defendant was released on bail in two separate cases when he committed a new, more serious crime involving a home invasion. He failed to appear at a pretrial hearing in the original cases, and a bench warrant was issued. A few days later, he was arrested for the home invasion and charged with, among other things, second degree murder. The court forfeited his bail on the two original cases and denied the sureties’ motions to remit. The sureties appealed.
The Commonwealth argued that the new crime was a breach of the bonds and that the expenses incurred to try the defendant on the new charges was a “cost” to be considered in deciding the motion to remit the forfeiture. The Commonwealth admitted that it did not incur added costs in relation to the original charges. The Court agreed that the new crime was a violation of the conditions of the bonds, but held that the entire amount of the forfeiture should have been remitted. The Court reasoned that the policy underlying remission of bail forfeitures is to encourage the surety to return the defendant and that to make the surety a guarantor of the defendant’s good behavior would be unjust and could not support a denial of remission. The normal costs to prosecute the new charges were unrelated to the defendant’s released status and not properly considered in deciding whether to remit all or part of the forfeiture.
Pennsylvania Case Law 2010
In Collins v. Commonwealth, 2010 WL 5071188 (Va.App. December 14, 2010) the defendant was a licensed bail bondsman in North Carolina. The bond principal failed to appear, and demand was made on the bond. The defendant learned that the bond principal would be attending a funeral in Virginia, and he went to Virginia to apprehend the bond principal even though the defendant was not licensed in Virginia. The defendant approached a man whom he believed was the bond principal and attempted at gun point to force him to get into the defendant’s truck. The victim showed identification proving that he was not the bond principal, and the defendant released him. The defendant appealed his convictions for attempted abduction and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The defendant argued that he had the common law right to seize the bond principal and believed in good faith that the victim was the bond principal. The Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of mistaken identity because it held that the defendant had no right to seize the bond principal in Virginia. The Court found that the Virginia General Assembly abrogated the common law and provided by statute that only a bail bondsman or bail recovery agent licensed by the Virginia authorities could seize a bail bond principal in Virginia. The Court said, “Code §19.2-149 permits bail bondsmen who are licensed in Virginia and similarly licensed bail enforcement agents to seize their bailees. Appellant did not have such a license, so the Code did not authorize his seizure of Sydnor [the bond principal] or anyone else in Virginia.” The Court affirmed the convictions.
In Commonwealth v. Liberty Bail Bonds, 2010 WL 4722180 (Pa.Cmwlth. November 23, 2010) the Court held that the requirement that a professional bondsman have an office in the county in order to qualify for a license did not apply to a surety agent licensed by the Insurance Department. The clerk had relied on a Local Rule of Criminal Procedure applicable to professional bondsmen in rejecting the application, and the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County denied the applicant’s appeal. The Commonwealth Court reversed and directed that the clerk issue the license.
Pennsylvania Case Law 2006
In Surety Administrators, Inc. v. Samara, 2006 WL 891430 (E.D.Pa. April 6, 2006) an assignee of Capital Bonding’s claims sued a subagent for allegedly unpaid bond premiums and fees based on unaccounted for powers of attorney. The subagent moved for summary judgment. The court examined the various claims and counterclaims between Capital Bonding and the subagent, and held that there were disputed issues of fact that precluded summary judgment.
Aegis Security Insurance Co. v. Harco National Insurance Co., 2006 WL 1722395 (M.D.Pa. June 22, 2006) granted Harco’s motion to compel arbitration of a dispute arising out of several reinsurance agreements related to bonds written through Capitol Bonding. The dispute involved the right of setoff against money Harco owed under a 2002 reinsurance treaty for immigration bond losses incurred in a settlement Aegis negotiated with the Department of Homeland Security. The 2002 reinsurance treaty provided for setoff and contained an arbitration clause. The court held that disputes about the scope of the setoff provision would be resolved in the arbitration.
In Surety Administrators, Inc. v. Samara, 2006 WL 1737390 (E.D.Pa. June 20, 2006) the court denied Highlands Insurance Company’s motion to intervene in a suit to compel a subagent to remit premiums and other money allegedly owed under agreements with Capitol Bonding. Highlands alleged that Surety Administrators, Inc, on behalf of Harco, Aegis and Sirius, was trying to collect funds, or had collected funds, that should have gone to Highlands. The court thought that in this suit Surety Administrators and the other plaintiffs were not claiming anything owed to Highlands, and Highlands could file its own suit to recover anything it was owed.
Pennsylvania Case Law 2005
In Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 2005 WL 2403814 (Pa. Super. September 30, 2005) the trial court refused to consider the equitable factors relevant to remission of forfeiture because the surety’s efforts did not have a substantial impact on the defendant’s recovery. The Court of Appeals held that the three equitable factors should be considered, along with the bondsmen’s role in recovering the defendant. Upon consideration of the factors, however, the Court of Appeals held that no remission was justified and affirmed the trial court’s result. The factors were: (1) willfulness of the defendant’s breach, (2) cost, delay and inconvenience to the government and the court, and (3) any explanation or mitigating factors. In this case, the defendant acted willfully and there was prejudice to the government and the court. There were no mitigating factors and thus no basis for relief from the forfeiture.
Pennsylvania Case Law 2003
In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Mayfield, 2003 WL 21246377 (Pa. Super. May 30, 2003) the defendant violated a condition of his bail by committing an assault shortly after release. The trial court forfeited the bond. The appellate court reversed. The court held that in considering remission of forfeiture, a court must consider the willfulness of the defendant’s breach, the cost, inconvenience and prejudice to the government and any explanation or mitigating circumstances. The Court of Appeals did not think the facts supported forfeiture, but at least the willfulness test should have been met since upon his release the defendant went to his girlfriend’s house and broke her nose. Because there were no apparent mitigating circumstances, in effect the court held that a bail bond cannot be forfeited unless the government can show prejudice from the defendant’s breach. There was a dissenting opinion.