Indiana Case Laws
Click on the below to read Indiana Case Laws for the following years:
Indiana Bail Case Laws
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2004
2003
Indiana Bail Case Laws
In Jones v. Markey, 2012 WL 2450759 (Ind.App. June 28, 2012) the defendant’s mother paid the premiums for bonds to obtain the defendant’s release on two charges. The bonds were posted, and the defendant exited the jail and walked about 50 feet where he was arrested on other, independent charges. The mother sued the bail agent to recover the premiums. The trial court held for the bail agent. The agent and surety did what they were obligated to do, and the defendant’s mother was not entitled to a refund.
Indiana Case Laws 2011
In Gaeta v. State, Case No. 79A02-1011-CR-1196 (Ind.App. September 13, 2011) the defendant failed to appear. The surety represented 364 days later that it had located him in Mexico and he was too ill to travel. The trial court assessed 80% late surrender charges (the statutory late surrender fee percentage if the surety complies more than 240 but less than 365 days after notice was mailed). The trial court did not forfeit the remaining 20% of the bond. The surety appealed and the State cross-appealed.
The Court held that even if the surety’s representations were accepted as facts, the trial court did not err in assessing the 80% late surrender fee. The Court rejected the surety’s argument that the late surrender fees required by subsection (c) of I.C. §27-10-2-12 did not apply if the surety showed within the 365 day period that it could not return the defendant because of one of the causes listed in subsection (b) – in this case illness. The Court recognized that the trial court had discretion under subsection (e) of the statute to waive the late surrender fees, but held that under the facts the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing any waiver.
On the State’s cross appeal, the Court held that the 20% forfeiture should have been assessed. The Court held that subsection (b) of the statute meant that the defendant’s initial appearance on the scheduled court date was caused by illness or death not that the surety was unable to produce him during the 365 day period because of illness or death. Thus, it was irrelevant that the surety could not return the defendant from Mexico because of the defendant’s illness. There was no persuasive evidence that he failed to appear on the scheduled court date because of illness, and the Court remanded the case with instructions to add the 20% forfeiture to the judgment for the late surrender fees.
In Frontier Insurance Co. v. State, Case No. 20A04-1102-CR-89 (Ind.App. August 17, 2011) the defendant failed to appear in 1998 and the clerk mailed notice to the agent and to the surety’s address shown on the power of attorney, but not to the surety’s address in the bond. In 2010, the court entered judgment for the bond amount, and the surety appealed. Indiana Code §27-10-2-12(a)(2) required that notice be mailed to the surety “at each of the addresses indicated in the bonds.” The Court held that notice to the agent and surety was a condition precedent to forfeiture of the bond and that notice was required to be mailed to the printed address in the bond even though the notice mailed to the address in the power of attorney apparently was received. Notice to the address in the power may have been substantial compliance, but it fell short of “the full measure of protection afforded to sureties” by the statute. The Court reversed the judgment of forfeiture.
In Sneed v. State, Case No. 16A01-1010-CR-544 (Ind.App. April 25, 2011) the defendant was charged with two counts of selling methamphetamine. The trial court set her bond at $25,000 cash only and denied her motion to reduce the amount or permit a surety bond. The defendant appealed, and the Court held that in light of the serious charges and potential period of incarceration the trial court did not abuse its discretion as to the amount of the bond. The Court held, however, that it was an abuse of discretion not to permit a surety bond as an alternative. In a footnote, the Court described the surety alternative as: “A bail bondsman will, in return for a non-refundable fee paid by the defendant, put up his own money with the trial court in the form of a surety, pledging to cover the defendant’s bail. Because the bondsman is risking the entire amount if the defendant fails to appear for trial, the bondsman has a powerful incentive to return the defendant to court to face charges. On the other hand, when the defendant is able to deposit the entire amount of the cash bail without the help of a bondsman, it is not very likely anyone will pursue the defendant if he or she decides to skip town prior to trial.”
Indiana Case Law 2010
In Osburn v. State, 2011 WL 193418 (Ind.App. January 21, 2011) a bondsman appealed his convictions for theft, obstruction of justice and insurance fraud. The defendant’s wife paid for the bond by check, but the check bounced. The bondsman then went to the court clerk and obtained the bond and power of attorney with the explanation that the check had bounced. The bondsman had “VOID” written across the bond and sent it to the surety. The Court affirmed the convictions for theft and insurance fraud but vacated the conviction for obstruction of justice on double jeopardy grounds because it rested on proof of the same facts as the theft charge..
Indiana Case Law 2009
In Awald v. State, 2009 WL 426195 (Ind.App. February 19, 2009) the agent was tipped off that the defendant intended to leave the state. She located him and called for local police help. He was in a different county than the one in which the charges were pending, however, and the local police would only turn the defendant over to the police from the other county. The other county would not come to get him, and he was released and left the state. When he failed to appear, the court entered judgment for 20% of the face amount of the bond, and the surety appealed. The Court held that the statute permitted the surety to avoid a forfeiture if, within one year, it produced the defendant or showed that the defendant’s appearance was prevented by death, illness, incarceration or the court’s failure to give a required notice. Since none of these applied, the judgment was affirmed. [Not published].
In Harris v. State, 2009 WL 2777773 (Ind.App. September 2, 2009) the defendant failed to appear and the court eventually entered judgment against the surety. The issue was whether the required statutory notice of the defendant’s failure to appear was given to the agent and surety. The court record included initials and a date for notice and, as to the surety, a returned envelope addressed to the surety’s address shown on the bond. The Court held that as to the surety there was sufficient proof of notice. The returned envelope showed the notice was mailed, and if the address was incorrect that was the fault of the surety or its agent. The statute also required notice to the agent, however, and the Court held that the dated initials were insufficient proof of service. The Court looked to the civil rule on proof of service by mail and held that service of the notice should be shown by a comparable certificate or by using certified mail. The Court remanded the case to give the state an opportunity to present any other evidence that the notice was mailed to the agent and directed that if there was no such evidence the judgment should be vacated.
Indiana Case Law 2008
In Campbell v. A.A.A. Bail Bonds, 2008 WL 187968 (Ind.App. January 22, 2008) an indemnitor appealed summary judgment for the bail agent awarding expenses the agent incurred to locate the defendant and arrange his surrender to authorities. The indemnitor argued that the indemnity agreement obligated him to the surety, not to the agent, and the agent sued for the agent’s own expenses not the surety’s. The Court rejected the arguments. The agreement was for the benefit of the surety and its agents and assigns, and the surety provided an affidavit that it assigned its interest to the agent. The Court affirmed the judgment.In Galloway v. Hadley, 881 N.E.2d 667 (Ind.App. 2008) a bail agent who had not contributed to the election campaign of the new sheriff of Hendricks County was removed from the “Preferred Agent List” used at the jail to call bail agents for inmates who did not already have an agent. The agent sued for an injunction against use of the Preferred Agent List as a violation of the Indiana Equal Access statute that guaranteed equal access to the jails for all properly licensed and registered bail agents. The trial court granted the injunction, and the sheriff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction. The Court held that there was a private right of action under the Equal Access Law, that use of the Preferred Agent List was a denial of equal access, that the complaining agent would suffer irreparable harm, and that continued use of the List was against the public interest.
In Haddix v. State, 2008 WL 786540 (Ind.App. March 26, 2008) the court set bond at $500,000. The next day the State moved to increase the amount of the bond. The defendant’s family contacted the surety, paid the $50,000 premium, and the defendant was released from jail. At the hearing on the State’s motion four days later, the court substantially increased the amount of the bail, and the defendant was taken into custody. After the defendant was sentenced, he sought, in the criminal case, to have the bond premium returned. The trial court refused the request, and the defendant appealed. The Court held that the bond contract was between the defendant’s family and the surety and the defendant did not have standing to seek return of the premium. The Court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s denial of the relief he sought.
In United States v. Odumabo, 2008 WL 2003229 (N.D.Ind. May 7, 2008) the defendant was released on an unsecured bond signed by his brother as surety. He failed to appear, and the court forfeited the bond and directed that token monthly payments be made. The Government re-arrested the defendant some 14 months later without any help from the surety. The defendant committed suicide while in custody, and the surety moved for relief from the bond forfeiture and the order to make monthly payments. Since the surety did not surrender the defendant, the surety’s only ground for relief under Federal Rule 46(f) was that justice did not require forfeiture of the bond. The court considered the relevant factors including the willfulness of the breach, the extended period the defendant was a fugitive, expense to the Government of recapturing him, and the lack of help from the surety. The court denied the motion and reiterated the order that the surety make monthly payments.
Indiana Case Law 2007
Shroyer v. State, 2007 WL 926057 (Ind.App. March 29, 2007) held that the 10% cash bond posted by the defendant could be applied by the state to pay the defendant’s fine and court costs. The court ordered a $1,500 cash only bond. The court interpreted that to be 10% of a $15,000 bond and so subject to application to fines, costs and administrative fees.
Smith v. Lake County, 863 N.E.2d 464 (Ind.App. 2007) is the latest in a series of cases in which a bail agent challenged the constitutionality of Indiana bail statutes and particularly the use of 10% cash bail. The Court held that the adverse decision in Lake County Clerk’s Office v. Smith, 766 N.E.2d 707 (Ind. 2002) barred the plaintiff’s claims because they could have been raised in the earlier case. The Court also noted Mr. Smith’s several other state and federal suits and appeals asserting similar challenges and imposed sanctions for vexatious and frivolous litigation.
Indiana Case Law 2006
Smith v. City of Hammond, 2006 WL 1460602 (Ind.App. May 30, 2006) was another version of a bail agent’s attempt to challenge the policy of a Judge on the Hammond City Court to require 10% cash bail. The Court held that the Judge and his agents (the police chief and court clerk) had complete judicial immunity and the bail agent did not have standing to challenge the Judge’s policy. The Court affirmed summary judgment dismissing the suit. This case was very similar in substance to Smith v. City of Hammond, 388 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2004) in which the Seventh Circuit rejected the same arguments. The Seventh Circuit warned of sanctions if the bail agent did not stop filing frivolous lawsuits, and in this case the Court remanded the case to the trial court to consider sanctions.
In Government Payment Service, Inc. v. Ace Bail Bonds, 854 N.E.2d 1205 (Ind.App. 2006) a group of bail agents sued Government Payment Service (GPS) for violating the Indiana statute on licensing of bail agents and tortious interference with the bail agents’ contracts. The trail court granted a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent injunction, restraining GPS from facilitating the payment of cash bail in Indiana. GPS counterclaimed for malicious prosecution. GPS had contracts with three courts under which inmates could charge their cash bail. GPS received a fee in connection with each transaction, and the bail agents argued that this violated IC 27-10-3-1 under which only a licensed bail agent may charge a fee to post a bail bond. The Court of Appeals reversed the injunction and held, “Facilitating the access of incarcerated defendants to credit which they in turn post as cash bail is not engaging in the writing of bail bonds, and it is not tortious interference with the business relationships of the Bail Agents.” The Court also held that the lower court case terminated in the bail agents’ favor, therefore GPS could not recover on its counterclaim.
Indiana Case Law 2004
In State v. Boles, 2004 WL 1445441 (Ind. June 29, 2004) the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court and Court of Appeals and held that late surrender fees and bond forfeiture can be imposed even though the court failed to give the bail agent or surety advance notice of the appearance date as required by Ind. Code §27-10-2-8(a). The Supreme Court also held that the clerk, as opposed to the Judge, could assess the late surrender fees. The bail agent and surety would still be entitled to receive notice that the defendant failed to appear pursuant to §27-10-2-12(a), and only the Judge could declare a forfeiture of the bond. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the late surrender fees should be waived pursuant to §27-10-2-12(e) because of the surety’s or bail agent’s diligent efforts to locate the defendants.
In Smith v. City of Hammond, 388 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2004) a City Court judge refused to permit use of a surety bond for bail and instead ordered that bail be “cash bond” meaning that the defendant had to deposit 10% of the face amount of the bail and would receive that deposit, less certain deductions, back if she appeared. The bondsman sued the judge, the city court, the City, the police chief and the city clerk asserting that he was deprived of a property right in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. The alleged property right was his license as a bondsman. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction and appealed its denial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on multiple grounds and remanded the case with the suggestion that it be dismissed “without further ado” since it was plainly without merit.
Indiana Case Law 2003
State v. Boles, 792 N.E.2d 553 (Ind. App. 2003) involved a consolidated appeal of nine cases in which the trial court clerk imposed “late surrender fees” after the defendant failed to appear. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order vacating the fees and exonerating the bonds. In each case, the court had failed to give the bail bondsman or surety advance notice of the trial or hearing date at which the defendant did not appear. The Court of Appeals held that such notice was mandatory. The Court also held that only a trial court judge, not the clerk, could assess late surrender fees.