South Carolina Case Laws

South Carolina Case Laws

Click on the below to read South Carolina Case Laws for the following years:
2011
2009
2006
2004

South Carolina Case Law 2011

In State v. Jenkins, Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-542 (S.C.App. December 5, 2011) the surety argued that the trial court failed to apply the factors set forth in Ex parte Polk, 579 S.E.2d 329 (S.C.App. 2003) in refusing to remit any portion of the bond.  The Court held that the surety had not preserved its issue for appeal and affirmed the judgment.

In State v. Hinojos, Opinion No. 4850 (S.C.App. July 6, 2011) the original conditions of release for the defendant included electronic monitoring.  Without notice to the sureties, the court agreed to remove the electronic monitoring requirement.  The defendant pled guilty and was allowed to remaining free pending sentencing.  A representative of one of the three sureties was present for the guilty plea, was asked if he consented to remain on the bond, and stated that he did.  The defendant failed to appear for sentencing, and the court estreated that surety’s one-third of the bond.  On appeal, the Court held that deleting the electronic monitoring was not a modification that discharged the surety because the surety agreed to remain on the bond with knowledge that electronic monitoring was no longer required.  The Court also held that the surety was estopped to invoke the statute of frauds requirement that a bond modification be in writing because the State relied on the surety’s oral statement that it would remain on the bond.  If the surety’s representative had not agreed in court to remain bound, the State would have opposed releasing the defendant pending sentencing.  The Court also held, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in forfeiting the consenting surety’s entire one-third share of the bond penalty without considering the factors set forth in Ex Parte Polk, 579 S.E.2d 329 (S.C.App. 2003) including, at a minimum, the cost to the State, the purpose of the bond, and the nature and willfulness of the default.  The Court confirmed estreatment of the bond but remanded the case for reconsideration of the amount.

State v. Miller, Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-284 (S.C.App. June 10, 2011) affirmed the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to remit only a part of the bond amount.

South Carolina Case Law 2009

In Jones v. Robbin, 2009 WL 437337 (D.S.C. January 21, 2009) the bail agent seized the defendant and surrendered him to the county jail where he remained at the time the suit was filed. The prisoner sued the jail warden and the bail agent alleging that a South Carolina statute on surrender of defendants by bail sureties had not been followed to the deprivation of the prisoner’s civil rights. The court reviewed and dismissed the pro se complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. The court held that the bail bondsman was not a state actor for purposes of the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §1983.

In State v. Lara, 2009 WL 4250771 (S.C. November 30, 2009) the defendant failed to appear and a bench warrant was signed, but there was a delay in actually issuing the warrant.  The surety returned the defendant to custody 42 days after the warrant was issued.  At the time, S.C. Code §38-53-70 provided that the bond would be forfeited if the defendant was not surrendered within 30 days (the statute has since been amended to allow 90 days).  The trial court refused to estreat the bond to the State, and the State appealed.  The Court held that upon expiration of the 30 day recovery period a conditional estreature had to be entered, but the surety could still request remission of the forfeiture.  The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion in deciding whether to remit all or part of the bond amount.

South Carolina Case Law 2006

State v. McClinton, 631 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 2006) held that the three year limitation period of S.C. Code §15-3-530(1) for an action on a contract applied to bar the State’s claim on a bail bond. There was no statutory limitation period specifically for bail bonds, but the State’s right to forfeiture of the bail bond arose from contract. As a matter of first impression, the Court held that the three year period applied and that it started to run 30 days after issuance of a bench warrant for the defendant’s failure to appear. Therefore, the State’s claim was time barred.

South Carolina Case Law 2004

In State v. Cochran, 594 S.E.2d 844 (S.C. 2004) the bail agent signed the bonds as surety and attached a power of attorney from Frontier Insurance Company. The state sued for the amount owed on the forfeited (in South Carolina, “estreated”) bonds. The bail agent argued that Frontier was in rehabilitation and the Order of Rehabilitation prevented the suit. He claimed that he was just the agent for a known principal and so had no personal liability. The Court rejected the argument and pointed out that the bond on its face showed the bail agent as the surety not as agent for someone else.

In Ex parte Gene Frye Bail Bonds, 2004 WL 943531 (S.C. App. May 3, 2004) the defendant was arrested on additional charges and failed to make a court appearance. The surety sought relief from its obligations on the bond. The statute allowing such relief, S.C. Code §38-53-50, prior to its amendment in 1998, stated that the court could order a partial refund of the fee. That provision was eliminated in the 1998 amendments, and the Court of Appeals concluded “the governing statute does not authorize the circuit court to require a bonding company to pay any portion of the fee back to the defendant or his guarantor in order to be released from a bond.”