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Oklahoma Case Laws

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Oklahoma Case Laws

Click on the below to read Oklahoma Case Laws for the following years:
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2004

Oklahoma Bail Case Law 2012

In State v. Tate, 2012 OK 31, Case No. 108513 (Okl. April 10, 2012) the bail agent paid the forfeiture on the 92nd day after receiving notice of the forfeiture.  59 O.S. §1332(D)(1) required payment by the 91st day.  A few days later, the bail agent returned the defendant to custody and timely moved to set aside the forfeiture, exonerate the bond, and remit the payment.  The trial court granted remission, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.  The Court stated the issue and result as, “We granted the State’s petition for certiorari to determine whether deposit of the face amount of the bond by the ninety-first day after notice of forfeiture, as required by 59 O.S. §1332(D)(1), is a condition precedent to seeking the relief of remitter provided by 59 O.S. Supp. 2008 §1332(D)(2).  We answer in the affirmative.”  The Court reviewed the amendments to §1332 and the re-arrangement of its subsections and concluded unless the bondsman timely complies with (D)(1), he may not seek remitter of the forfeiture under (D)(2).  The Court vacated the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court.

Oklahoma Case Law 2011

In State v. Young, 2010 WL 5635591 (Ok.Civ.App. December 3, 2010) the defendant was separately charged with drug related offenses in two different counties.  The surety provided bonds for his release.  In one county he pled guilty but was allowed to remain free on bond.  After the guilty plea, he appeared twice more in the other county but failed to appear for his trial.  The bond was forfeited and the surety appealed denial of its motion to set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond.  The surety argued that by statute the defendant should not have been allowed to remain free on bond in the first county after his guilty plea, and that by doing so the court increased the surety’s risk on the second bond.  The Court found that when the surety wrote the bond it was not counting on the defendant’s incarceration in the other county and noted that the surety could have surrendered the defendant at the time of either of the two post-guilty plea appearances.  The Court affirmed denial of the surety’s motion.

Oklahoma Case Law 2010

In State v. Young, 2010 WL 5635591 (Ok.Civ.App. December 3, 2010) the defendant was separately charged with drug related offenses in two different counties.  The surety provided bonds for his release.  In one county he pled guilty but was allowed to remain free on bond.  After the guilty plea, he appeared twice more in the other county but failed to appear for his trial.  The bond was forfeited and the surety appealed denial of its motion to set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond.  The surety argued that by statute the defendant should not have been allowed to remain free on bond in the first county after his guilty plea, and that by doing so the court increased the surety’s risk on the second bond.  The Court found that when the surety wrote the bond it was not counting on the defendant’s incarceration in the other county and noted that the surety could have surrendered the defendant at the time of either of the two post-guilty plea appearances.  The Court affirmed denial of the surety’s motion.

In Surety Bail Bondsmen of Oklahoma, Inc.  v. Insurance Commissioner, 2010 WL 4102921 (Okla. October 19, 2010) the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed a long-standing interpretation of the Insurance Department and held that: (1) an Oklahoma professional bondsman can be registered in only one county – either where he or she resides or where he or she has his or her office; (2) a professional bondsman can write only ten bonds per year in each of the other 76 counties except for counties in which there is no registered bondsman; and (3) the ten bond rule cannot be circumvented by employing a licensed surety bondsmen as an agent to write bonds in a county where the professional bondsman is not registered.  The Court found that the professional bondsman could not do via an agent what he could not do himself.  In a 5-2 decision, the Court found that the ten bond limitation in 59 O.S. §1320(B) was clear and that the Department, the district court and the Court of Civil Appeals had erred in its interpretation.

Oklahoma Case Law 2009

In State v. Tyler, 2009 WL 3003873 (Okla. September 22, 2009) the defendant failed to appear for her arraignment, but her attorney was present and attributed her absence to “travel problems.”  The court continued the arraignment without setting a new date.  Two days later, the defendant appeared and was arraigned.  She again failed to appear later in the proceedings and the bond was forfeited.  The surety appealed arguing that the court was obligated to declare the forfeiture on the first failure to appear and if it had her appearance two days later would have exonerated the bond so it would not have been in force later in the proceedings.  The surety also argued that the indefinite continuance materially increased the surety’s risk and so discharged the bond.  While the appeal was pending, the defendant was recovered and pled guilty.  The Court of Appeals affirmed judgment against the surety, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  The Supreme Court held that the trial court had the authority to continue the arraignment upon good cause shown, and so the continuance did not violate the statute, but that continuance without setting a new appearance date materially increased the surety’s risk and discharged the bond.  The Court relied on the fact that no new date was set to distinguish a prior case, but it did not explain why the surety was prejudiced by such a continuance but would not have been prejudiced if the continuance had been to a date certain.

Oklahoma Case Law 2008

In State v. Salcedo-Rubio, 195 P.3d 1286 (Ok.Civ.App. 2008) the defendant was a citizen of Mexico in the U.S. legally. After release on bond he fled to Mexico. The surety’s agents verified he had fled and attempted to locate him in Mexico. Shortly before the 90 day period to return him expired, the surety asked the district attorney’s office to initiate extradition proceedings. The district attorney’s office replied that extradition from Mexico was very time consuming and required voluminous paperwork. The surety sought to set aside forfeiture of the bond. The court held that under the circumstances the surety had not shown “good cause” for its failure to return the defendant. The surety knew he was a Mexican citizen, and the difficulty in persuading Mexico to extradite its citizens is well established. The court also recognized that the bond could be exonerated if the government increased the surety’s risk, but here the surety took the risk that the defendant would go to Mexico and be difficult or impossible to extradite, and the government’s failure or refusal to seek extradition did not increase that risk. The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the bond.

Oklahoma Case Law 2004

State of Oklahoma v. Torres, 2004 WL 334978 (Okl. February 24, 2004) held that the appellate courts could not consider events happening during the appeal, in this case the apprehension and return of the defendant, in deciding whether the bond forfeiture should be set aside. The majority also held that on the record presented the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vacate the forfeiture on a showing that the bail agent located the defendant in Mexico and requested the Oklahoma district attorney’s office to request a federal fugitive warrant from the U.S. Attorney’s office but that the district attorney unreasonably delayed making the request. In a dissenting opinion reported separately at 2004 WL 334981 (Okl. February 24, 2004), two judges agreed that the court could not consider the mid-appeal return of the defendant but argued that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for relief from forfeiture. Both the majority and the dissent were critical of the quality of the record made in the trial court, but the determining factor for the dissent seemed to be the trial judge’s comment that the bail agent could have expedited the defendant’s return by bribing the Mexican authorities. The dissenting judges argued that if the bail agent took every legal step available, he established good cause to vacate the forfeiture, and that if the trial court required illegal steps he abused his discretion.

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