Connecticut Case Laws
Click on the below to read Connecticut Case Laws for the following years:
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
Connecticut Case Law 2012
In State v. Al-Noori, 2012 WL 1511385 (Conn.Super. April 12, 2012) the defendant, a citizen of Pakistan, failed to appear on January 14 and the bonds were forfeited with the forfeiture stayed for six months as provided in G.S. 54-65a(a)(3). The defendant failed to appear for a federal immigration hearing on February 15, and a Removal Order was issued. On July 14 the defendant voluntarily left the United States via a flight to Pakistan. The surety moved for relief from the forfeiture arguing that the Removal Order made it impossible to return the defendant. The court disagreed and denied relief. The court thought that the Removal Order did not cause the defendant to leave the United States. He left voluntarily, and it was pure speculation by the surety that if the surety detained him and tried to bring him back the federal government would not permit his entry.
Connecticut Case Law 2011
In Moore v. Sylvia, 2011 WL 5925118 (Conn.Super. November 4, 2011) the surety was concerned that the bond principal intended to abscond. The surety and his employees seized the bond principal at gunpoint, held him chained to a chair in a motel room for an entire evening, otherwise abused him, and only on the following day obtained a mittimus and took him to a correctional center. The bond principal filed this civil action against the surety. The court found that the 1990 enactment of G.S. 54-65 changed the common law rights of the surety to seize the bond principal. G.S. 54-65 required application to the court for a mittimus followed by the arrest of the defendant and his surrender to a correctional center. The court stated, “There is no excuse for the failure of a professional bondsman not (sic.) to know the law with respect to his obligations” and entered judgment for the bond principal in the amounts of $15,000 compensatory and $5,000 punitive damages.
In Arroyo v. State of Connecticut Insurance Commissioner, 2011 WL 4583820 (Conn.Super. September 14, 2011) the insurance department issued a complaint against a surety bail agent and agency. The complaint required an answer within twenty days of service. The attorney for the agent and agency corresponded with the insurance department, but a timely answer was not filed. The department’s commissioner entered a default judgment and cancelled a scheduled hearing. The agent and agency promptly moved to re-open the case and filed an answer. The department opposed re-opening the matter, and the commissioner denied the motion. The agent and agency appealed, and the Superior Court found that the regulations had been followed, the agent and agency had been afforded due process, and the default judgment was proper. The court also affirmed the commissioner’s exercise of his discretion in not finding “good cause” to reopen the case and dismissed the appeal.
In State v. Sheriff, Case No. SC 18293 (Conn. July 19, 2011) the surety wrote the bond knowing that the defendant was a native of Jamaica. Two days before trial, he fled to Jamaica. The surety located him there, but the chief states attorney declined to attempt to have him extradited because Jamaica will seldom extradite its citizens for drug offenses. The trial court denied the surety’s motion for compromise or release of the bond. The surety appealed. The Court did not reach the question of whether a partial remission of the amount forfeited was permissible because it held the surety had not shown good cause for relief from its obligation. To determine what constituted good cause, the Court looked to the common law rule of Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872) which affirmed the Connecticut Supreme Court decision in Taintor v. Taylor, 36 Conn. 242 (1869). Good cause required that the defendant’s failure to appear for trial be caused by an act of God, an act of the bond obligee, or an act of the law. Here, the defendant’s willful flight was the cause of his failure to appear, and that was the very risk the surety took in writing the bond. The State did not cause the default and was not preventing the defendant from returning. The defendant was released to the custody of the surety, and the surety let him get away. There was no good cause for relief from the forfeiture, and the chief states attorney’s refusal to seek extradition or alleged conflict of interest in preferring the bond penalty to return of the defendant were irrelevant to the issue before the Court.
Connecticut Case Law 2010
In State v. Gooden, 2010 WL 3259820 (Conn.Super. July 16, 2010) the bondsman filed a motion asking for relief from a bond forfeiture because the defendant had fled to Jamaica and the State was not willing to try and extradite him. The court thought the motion raised many interesting questions but refused to consider them. The court held that the motion was premature until the State brought an action to collect on the bond.
In Arroyo v. Bajramj, 2010 WL 2682750 (Conn.Super. May 26, 2010) a bail agent sued the defendant for an allegedly unpaid balance of the premium. The parties agreed that bonds totaling $215,000 were provided, $6,450 was paid in cash, and the defendant appeared as required. The issue was any unpaid balance of the premium. The documents submitted by the plaintiff were notable for uncompleted blanks and references to security for appearance rather than premium amounts. They did not state an unpaid premium balance. The plaintiff argued he was owed $9,150 plus attorneys fees and relied on Conn. G.S. §29-151, which the court found stated a maximum premium but did not set a minimum amount. The defendant, however, admitted that after he was released he agreed to pay another $2,500 and the court found support for a $150 “B.U.F. Fund” assessment. The court entered judgment for $2,650 and no attorneys fees.
Connecticut Case Law 2009
In Casey Surety Company, Inc. v. Charles, 2009 WL 5184315 (Conn.Super. December 4, 2009) the defendant’s father obtained the bond by agreeing to indemnify the surety or its agent. After the defendant failed to appear, the surety’s agent satisfied the forfeiture and sued on the indemnity agreement. The indemnitor argued that the agreement was with the surety company and did not mention the agent by name. He contested the standing of the agent to sue on the agreement and moved for summary judgment. The court denied the motion on two grounds. First, the agreement protected the surety’s agents as well as the surety. Second, having paid the forfeiture, the agent was subrogated to the surety’s rights against the indemnitor.
Connecticut Case Law 2008
In State v. Odell, 2008 WL 2068197 (Conn.Super. April 25, 2008) the mother of the defendant pledged real property as surety for her son’s appearance. At a time when he had not defaulted, she asked the court to revoke the bonds because he had moved out of her house and had little contact with her. The court discussed the right of a surety to seize and surrender the defendant and its statutory right to inform the court that it believed the defendant intended to abscond and to ask the court to order the defendant’s arrest. The surety in this case, however, did neither. She did not surrender the defendant or tell the court that he was likely to flee and ask for his arrest. Under these circumstances, there was no basis for the court to revoke the bonds, and the surety’s motion was denied.
In Hernandez v. Carbone, 2008 WL 2900932 (D.Conn. July 29, 2008) an indigent defendant, against whom charges were ultimately dropped, spent a year in jail because he could not post a $100,000 bond. He sued, among others, the Executive Director of the Connecticut Court Support Services Division (CSSD) arguing that requiring cash or surety bonds from an indigent defendant was unconstitutional. The court granted the Executive Director’s motion to dismiss. The trial court, not CSSD, set the $100,000 bail and refused to reduce it. No act of the Executive Director, therefore, caused the alleged harm to the plaintiff for purposes of his federal civil rights claims. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over any state law claims or to interfere with the administration of bail by the Connecticut courts because the state court system provided more than adequate opportunities for a defendant to challenge his bail. The court was careful, however, to say that it was not deciding the merits of the plaintiff’s claims and he was free to assert them in a state court suit.
Connecticut Case Law 2007
Surety Administrators, Inc. v. Guadalupe (In Re Guadalupe), 2007 WL 766233 (D.Conn. March 15, 2007) affirmed judgment of the bankruptcy court disallowing the $791,038.38 claim of Capitol Bonding Corporation, and of Harco Insurance Co. and Surety Administrators, Inc. as Capitol Bonding’s successors. The debtor was a sub-agent whose contract with Capitol Bonding named Vincent Smith as the supervising agent. The contract provided that as long as the debtor acted in accordance with the agreement (essentially did what the supervising agent told him to do) he had no responsibility for bond forfeitures. The debtor testified that he did as he was instructed, and that on the few occasions that Capitol Bonding sent him an invoice, he called Smith and he did not hear any more about it. The bankruptcy court credited his testimony and found that he did not breach the agreement and so owed nothing to the creditors. The U.S. District Court affirmed and commented on the lack of invoices or records one would expect if in fact the debtor owed Capitol Bonding the large sums claimed.
Connecticut Case Law 2006
In Tirreno v. Mott, 2006 WL 2806609 (D.Conn. September 29, 2006) the plaintiffs sued several bail enforcement agents, a bail agent and a surety for alleged torts in seeking to recover the bond principal. The court granted the surety summary judgment dismissing the suit because there was no evidence to support a finding that the bail agent or bail recovery agents were acting as agents of the surety. The court discussed and rejected arguments based on the surety’s agreement with the bail agent, a Connecticut statute and the common law doctrine of nondelegable duties. The court held that there were genuine issues of fact precluding summary judgment for the other defendants.
Connecticut Case Law 2005
International Fidelity Insurance Co. v. Spencer, 2005 WL 2496843 (Conn. Super. September 8, 2005) held that the statute of frauds did not bar a claim by the surety against the defendant’s mother who made an oral promise to indemnify the surety. The court found that her agreement was an original, primary promise not a promise to answer for the debt or default of her son.
Connecticut Case Law 2004
State of Connecticut v. Prazeres, 2004 WL 575060 (Conn. Super. February 27, 2004) held that the surety, Capital Bonding Corporation, was entitled to remission of 30% of the forfeited bail because the defendant was returned to custody within 270 days. The opinion discusses the schedule of amounts to be remitted pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. §54-65a and Practice Book §38-22.
Connecticut Case Law 2003
State v. Jacobs, 2003 WL 23112746 (Conn. Super. December 12, 2003) is a muddled opinion in which the court granted the surety’s summary judgment motion discharging its bail obligation. The defendant was originally released on a $10,000 bond. After conviction, another $140,000 bond was required. The case involved liability on the $140,000 bond.The defendant did not appear for sentencing. Instead of issuing a warrant and continuing sentencing, the court ordered the bond forfeited and then sentenced the defendant, in absentia, to 20 years in prison. When the clerk called the case, the surety on the original $10,000 bond was named instead of the surety on the $140,000 bond, but the court rejected that error as a basis to discharge the surety. The court did, however, grant the surety’ s summary judgment motion because Conn. Gen. Stats. §54-66a(8) provides that a bond is automatically terminated when the defendant is sentenced and because the substantial sentence imposed increased the surety’s risk by decreasing its chance to avoid liability by producing the defendant within the six month period following forfeiture.