Idaho Case Laws
Click on the below to read Idaho Case Laws for the following years:
2012
2011
2010
2008
2007
2005
Idaho Case Laws 2012
In State v. Two Jinn, Inc., Docket No. 38620, Unpublished Op. No. 332 (Idaho App. January 24, 2012) the defendant was arrested on another charge six days after his release on bond. He did not secure a bond on the new charge, but Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) placed a hold against him. After the new charge was resolved, he was released to ICE and transported by ICE to Utah. He consequentially failed to appear for a pretrial conference, and the bond was forfeited. A few weeks later, he was returned to Idaho and appeared in court. The court reinstated the bond with the surety’s consent and found that his prior failure to appear had been justified. He was then returned to ICE. When he again failed to appear, the bond was forfeited a second time. The surety filed a “Notice of Location of Defendant” indicating that the defendant was in ICE custody in Utah, but the State did not seek to have him returned. ICE deported him, and the surety moved to set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. The surety argued that the reinstated bond never took effect because the defendant was not released to the constructive custody of the surety since he was merely turned over to ICE. The Court found that because the defendant had a valid excuse for his first failure to appear, the trial court properly reinstated the bond. The Court did not reach the argument that release to the constructive custody of the surety is a precondition of a bond taking effect because the defendant was initially released and the bond was reinstated pursuant to statute. The Court stated, “Even assuming Two Jinn is correct in its interpretation of section 19-2911, in that custody must be transferred to the surety upon the posting of bail, we are not persuaded that compliance with section 19-2911 is a requirement for reinstatement pursuant to section 19-2916.”
Idaho Case Laws 2011
In State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 2011 WL 5222819 (Idaho November 3, 2011) the Court rejected the surety’s argument that deportation of the defendant excused the surety’s bond obligation. The surety argued that the contractual doctrine of impossibility of performance should apply and that the deportation made it impossible for it to produce the defendant. The Court thought that the immigration status of the defendant was a factor the surety could investigate before writing the bond and that it accepted the risk of deportation if it chose to write a bond for an illegal alien. The Court stated, “Thus the act by the federal government in deporting Navarro was not an unforeseen supervening act that would excuse performance.” The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the surety’s request for relief under former Idaho Criminal Rule 46(e)(4). The trial court exercised its discretion and considered the proper factors in concluding that justice did not require relief to the surety.
In Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai, 2011 WL 2652475 (Idaho July 8, 2011) a bail agent sued the Sheriff and Board of County Commissioners for breach of a prior settlement agreement, failing to produce documents in response to a public records request, and interfering with the agent’s ability to engage in the bail bond business. The Court affirmed dismissal of the case without reaching the merits of the agent’s claims, which apparently involved the Sheriff’s use or promotion of credit cards in lieu of bail bonds. The Court held that the agent’s tort claims were barred by his failure to give notice under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, that his claims against the Sheriff were barred by his failure to file a surety bond before filing suit, and that his claims against the Board of County Commissioners failed because the Sheriff was a Constitutional officer not subject to the control of the Board. The Court responded to the issue of how the agent could have filed a bond before filing suit by saying he should have petitioned the court to set the amount of the bond and then filed the bond along with his complaint.
In Two Jinn, Inc. v. District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 2011 WL 924026 (Idaho March 18, 2011) a licensed bail bond agency and two agents that it employed sued the administrative judge and other officials of one of the Idaho judicial districts over bail bond guidelines issued by the administrative judge. The Court held that the administrative judge could issue procedural guidelines but not substantive ones and rejected the administrative judge’s argument that judges have the inherent right to regulate bail, and who can write bail, in their courtrooms. The Court thought that guidelines making the bail agent personally responsible for payment of forfeited bonds, establishing qualifications in excess of those issued by the insurance department, and requiring annual criminal history checks were substantive. The Court also held that one of the bail agents was not denied due process when he was not granted a second hearing to determine whether he had complied with a licensing requirement. He was given notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Instead of requesting a hearing, he attempted to comply with the requirement. He was not entitled to a second hearing to determine whether his attempt was successful. Thirty-eight agents for whom he was the “supervising agent” were removed automatically from the list of approved agents when he was removed. Those 38 agents, however, were entitled to due process including a hearing. The Court noted that as licensed agents they had a right to practice their profession and could not be deprived of that right in the Fourth Judicial District without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Idaho Case Law 2010
In State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 2010 WL 4942176 (Idaho App. December 7, 2010) the surety located the defendant in another State and eventually returned him to custody in Idaho. The 180 appearance period had expired, however, so the surety was not entitled to automatic exoneration. Instead, the surety moved to set aside forfeiture and exonerate the bond on the ground that justice did not require its forfeiture. The trial court denied the motion and the surety appealed. The Court reviewed the factors to be considered and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the denying the surety relief. A concurring opinion evaluated the various factors more favorably to the surety but nevertheless agreed that the trial court acted within its discretion.
In State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 2010 WL 1980404 (Idaho App. May 19, 2010) the defendant was released on bond. When he failed to appear for sentencing, the bond was forfeited. The surety argued that its bond was discharged, or in the alternative that the forfeiture should have been remitted, because the defendant had been deported. The Court rejected both arguments and affirmed judgment for the amount of the bond. The condition of the bond was the defendant’s appearance. If he failed to appear, the surety’s obligation was to pay. Surrendering the defendant during the 180 day appearance period was an opportunity to gain relief from the forfeiture, not the condition of the bond. There was nothing in the bond about the surety’s returning the defendant and so no basis to say that the surety’s performance became impossible upon the defendant’s deportation. The surety also did not show that the factors to be considered in deciding to remit all or part of a forfeiture entitled it to relief. The court thought that the procedure in the case was faulty and reviewed only the record made before the Magistrate, not the more extensive record created upon the surety’s appeal to the district court, but ultimately rejected the surety’s contention on its merits rather than for lack of proof that the defendant had been deported.
In State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 2010 WL 1338061 (Idaho App. April 7, 2010) the defendant failed to appear and the bond was forfeited. The surety located the defendant in Oregon, but he refused to return to Idaho. The surety moved to exonerate the bond on the ground that Oregon law did not permit it to seize and return the defendant, therefore it had done everything it could and justice did not require enforcement of the bond. The Court held that the lower courts correctly applied the factors in State v. Fry and did not abuse their discretion in denying the surety relief. The Court pointed out that the defendant’s breach was willful and the surety, even though it knew his location, did not notify law enforcement authorities and seek their help in returning the defendant to Idaho.
In State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 2010 WL 890449 (Idaho App. March 15, 2010) the defendant failed to appear at a pretrial conference and the bond was forfeited. Four months later, the defendant was arrested in another state and returned to Idaho by law enforcement. The surety moved to set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. The case was controlled by the law prior to the Idaho Bail Act of 2009. The applicable statute and court rule conflicted. The statute provided for exoneration if the defendant had a sufficient excuse for not appearing or if the person who provided the bail retuned him to custody within 180 days. The Rule provided for exoneration if the defendant was returned within 180 days. The Court held that the statute and rule were in conflict and that the statute controlled because the right involved was substantive not procedural. The Court, therefore, affirmed denial of the surety’s motion because the conditions of the statute were not met. The defendant did not have a sufficient excuse for failing to appear, and surety did not return him to custody.
Idaho Case Law 2008
In State v. Castro, 188 P.3d 935 (Idaho App. 2008) an incorrect case number was written on the bond. At some point, the error was corrected on the bond in the court’s file, and when the defendant failed to appear a timely notice was sent to the surety. The notice had the correct case number, which did not match the number on the surety’s file. The surety appealed forfeiture of the bond and argued that there was no meeting of the minds on issuance of a bond because the number did not describe the case in which the defendant was charged. The Court held that from all the circumstances, the surety clearly intended to provide a bond for the defendant in the case, and no actual prejudice resulted from the error. Just as a draftsman’s error can be corrected in a contract, the parties intended a bond for the case, and the bond would be reformed to correct the error and conform to what the parties intended. A valid bond agreement was formed, and the surety received timely notice of the forfeiture. The Court affirmed the judgment against the surety.
Idaho Case Law 2007
In State v. Beck, 167 P.3d 788 (Idaho App. 2007) the defendant failed to appear because he was incarcerated in another state. The court declared the bond forfeited and the surety received proper notice of the forfeiture. The surety moved to exonerate the bond, and the surety and State agreed to a series of extensions of the 90 day period during which the surety could produce the defendant and obtain an automatic exoneration. Eventually, the trial court held that the series of extensions was impermissible, that it could consider only the facts presented during the first 90 days following forfeiture, and on those facts it denied the motion. The surety and State stipulated to a stay of payment pending appeal. While the appeal was pending, the defendant filed a request for disposition of the Idaho charge pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, he was returned to Idaho, pled guilty to an amended charge, and received a judgment of conviction.
The Court of Appeals held under Idaho Criminal Rule 46 the court may, at any time prior to remittance, set aside all or part of the forfeiture if justice does not require a complete forfeiture. The Court agreed that the 90 day period for automatic exoneration cannot be extended, but thought that was irrelevant to this case because the surety did not move to extend the 90 day period. Rather, the surety sought to exonerate the bond (before remittance) pursuant to Rule 46. Once the 90 day period expires, the County must sue on the bond if the surety does not pay voluntarily. Here, there was no such suit. The surety can move to set aside the forfeiture, and once it is set aside to exonerate the bond, at any time before remittance. It is within the discretion of the trial court whether to set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond, in whole or in part, and in exercising that discretion the court should consider a series of factors including the willfulness of the failure to appear, the surety’s role in locating and apprehending the defendant, cost and prejudice to the State, the public interest and any mitigating factors. Since the trial court did not exercise its discretion because it thought it was limited to the facts presented in the 90 day period following forfeiture, the Court vacated the order denying the surety’s motion to exonerate the bond and remanded for the trial court to consider all of the facts of the case, including that the defendant was returned and the charge resolved. The Court pointed out that the point of bail was not a windfall to the State but rather to assure the defendant’s presence in court.
Idaho Case Law 2005
State v. Vargas, 111 P.3d 621 (Idaho App. 2005) is a very unfortunate case. Alladin Bail Bonds appealed denial of its motion to set aside forfeiture and motion to extend the 90 day period to produce the defendant. The first motion was based on the fact that the clerk put the wrong date on the notice of forfeiture so it was mailed within the required five days of the actual forfeiture but said the failure to appear occurred on a future date. The court held that the notice was sufficient. The court noted that Alladin was not mislead by the clerk’s mistake. Unfortunately, on the second motion the court held that there was no statutory authority to extend the 90 days to recover the defendant even though it was the custom of the courts to do so. There was, therefore, no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying the extension requested by Alladin. Presumably, extensions will no longer be available unless or until legislation is obtained to authorize them.