Arkansas Case Laws
Click on the below to read Arkansas Case Laws for the following years:
2012
2011
2010
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
Arkansas Case Law 2012
In Buddy York Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 2012 Ark. 252, Case No. CA 11-1008 (Ark.App. April 11, 2012) affirmed denial of the surety’s motion to set aside a bond forfeiture judgment. The defendant failed to appear and the court set a show cause hearing. No one appeared at the hearing, and the court entered a judgment forfeiting the bond. Over 90 days later, the surety moved to set aside the judgment and attached documents that the surety contended showed the defendant was incarcerated at the time he failed to appear and that the surety had informed the court of that fact. The motion was not filed within the time required by Rule 60 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial court denied it. The Court of Appeals affirmed because the surety did not raise in the trial court any argument that could constitute an exception to the time limits in Rule 60 and could not make such arguments for the first time on appeal.
In Magness v. State, 2012 WL 149765 (Ark. January 19, 2012) the defendant was convicted but released on a “bed space bond” until there was room for him in prison. He violated conditions of the bond by leaving the State without permission and not reporting to the surety. He was recovered in Colorado, returned to Arkansas, and convicted of second degree escape. He appealed, and the Court held that while released on the bed space bond he was not “in custody” for purposes of the escape statute. The Court reversed his conviction and dismissed the escape charge.
Arkansas Case Law 2011
In Ashlock v. Nickolich, 2011 WL 6042849 (W.D.Ark. November 15, 2011) a state prisoner filed a pro se suit against a bail bondsman pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 seeking to recover for alleged damage to collateral. The court dismissed the complaint as frivolous because the bondsman was not a state actor subject to suit under §1983. The court stated, “A bondsman is not a state actor where he neither purports to act pursuant to a warrant nor enlists the assistance of law enforcement officers in enforcing a warrant or in apprehending his principal.”
In Ashlock v. Nickolich, 2011 WL 6042849 (W.D.Ark. November 15, 2011) a state prisoner filed a pro se suit against a bail bondsman pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 seeking to recover for alleged damage to collateral. The court dismissed the complaint as frivolous because the bondsman was not a state actor subject to suit under §1983. The court stated, “A bondsman is not a state actor where he neither purports to act pursuant to a warrant nor enlists the assistance of law enforcement officers in enforcing a warrant or in apprehending his principal.”
In First Arkansas Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 2011 Ark.App. 332 (Ark.App. May 4, 2011) the surety provided a bond for release of a defendant but collected less than the required 10% premium. The court issued a rule to show cause why the surety should not be removed from the list of acceptable sureties in the county. The surety and the prosecuting attorney reached an agreement and the court entered a consent order stating that the surety acted in knowing and willful contempt and imposing a $1,000 fine with $500 suspended conditioned on future compliance with the premium requirement. The surety obtained new counsel and filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The Court of Appeals treated the proceeding as one for criminal contempt and considered the consent order the equivalent of a guilty plea. The Court held that it had no jurisdiction over the surety’s appeal because a guilty plea cannot be withdrawn after entry of judgment.
Arkansas Case Law 2010
In Reed v. Arvis Harper Bail Bonds, Inc., 2010 WL 3704979 (Ark. September 23, 2010) the Arkansas Professional Bail Bond Licensing Board suspended a company’s license, and professional bail bondsman license of the company’s owner, for writing a bond that was not properly secured and exceeded the licensee’s unsecured limit. On judicial review in the Circuit Court, the Court reversed the Board’s decision and held that the statute establishing the Board was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine because one member of the Board was required to be a judge. The Board appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court reinstated the result before the Board but avoided ruling on the separation of powers argument. The majority decision held that review of the Board’s decision was an impermissible collateral attack on the authority of the judge to serve on the Board and upheld the Board on the merits of the case. From the discussion, however, it appeared that at least most of the Court agreed that requiring a judge to be one of the members of the Board was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine and that on a direct attack the Board would lose.
Arkansas Case Law 2008
First Arkansas Bail Bonds v. State, 2008 WL 2042958 (Ark.App. May 14, 2008) held that forfeiture of a bail bond can be accomplished in the defendant’s criminal proceeding without the State having to file a separate civil action. The surety argued that Ark. Code §16-84-207(e)(2) required a separate civil action because it required a summons “as in civil actions, and the action shall be docketed and shall proceed as an ordinary civil action.” The Court rejected the surety’s argument and interpreted the statute to require only that the State proceed “as in” a civil matter within the context of the defendant’s criminal case.
In First Arkansas Bail Bonds v. State, 2008 WL 2132672 (Ark. May 22, 2008) and First Arkansas Bail Bonds v. State, 2008 WL 2132288 (Ark. May 22, 2008) the defendants failed to appear and the court sent a show cause notice to the surety. The notice, however, was not a summons and did not set a date for a hearing on forfeiture of the bonds. Some months later, the court issued a summons and held a hearing at which it forfeited the bonds. On appeal, the surety argued that the summonses were not “immediately issued” as required by Ark. Code §16-84-207(b)(2)(B). The Court thought that the initial notices, which were sent immediately, were not the summons because they did not set a date and time for a hearing. The Court rejected the State’s argument that the delay actually benefited the surety and so to apply the literal requirement that the summons be issued immediately would be an absurd result that the Legislature could not have intended. Arkansas law requires that service of process requirements be strictly complied with, and the plain meaning of “immediately” did not permit a delay of several months. The Court reversed judgments against the surety and remanded the cases.
Arkansas Case Law 2007
In Manuel Bail Bonds v. State, 2007 WL 104451 (Ark.App. January 17, 2007) the defendant gave a false name, and the Sheriff did not fingerprint her or keep any other record that would enable the surety to identify her. The surety argued that it should not be liable on the bond. The trial court forfeited $15,000 of the $50,000 bond, and the surety appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that it was up to the surety to know whom it was bonding and to produce the defendant when required and, while it did not condone the Sheriff’s failure to follow proper procedures, it would not shift responsibility to produce the defendant from the surety to the State.
In First Arkansas Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 2007 WL 987806 (Ark.App. April 4, 2007) the clerk mailed the surety notice of a forfeiture judgment two months after it was entered. The surety recovered the defendant within 90 days of receiving the notice, but more than 90 days after the judgment was entered. The surety moved for relief from the forfeiture under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60. The Court held that its motion was too late for relief under Rule 60(a), which must be filed within 90 days of entry of the judgment, and did not qualify for relief under Rules 60(b) or (c). The Court noted that there was a requirement that the clerk give the surety notice that the defendant failed to appear, but no requirement for notice of entry of the judgment.
In Bob’s Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 2007 WL 1207369 (Ark.App. April 25, 2007) the surety objected to the timeliness and form of its notification of default and summons to appear and show cause why the bond should not be forfeited. It appeared at the show cause hearing through its agent, however, and presented none of these objections. Instead, after judgment was entered, it filed a motion to set the judgment aside. The Court held that none of the stated grounds qualified as a basis for post-judgment relief under the civil rules. The surety had the opportunity to make its arguments at the show cause hearing, and having failed to do so cannot raise them by post-judgment motion. The Court also noted that the surety made other arguments on appeal that it had not presented to the trial court at all, and it refused to consider them for the first time on appeal.
In First Arkansas Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 2007 WL 2782832 (Ark.App. September 26, 2007) the defendant provided two bonds for the defendant. The second bond was posted after additional charges were added to the case. The defendant failed to appear, and the trial court forfeited both bonds. The surety appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed forfeiture of both bonds. The Court held that by appearing in the trial court and requesting an extension of time to apprehend the defendant, the surety waived any objection to the timing or form of service of process in the case. The Court refused to consider the surety’s argument that the additional charges and second bond exonerated the first bond because the argument was not raised in the trial court. Finally, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s giving the surety credit for only a part of the amount it claimed to have expended in attempting to locate the defendant.
Arkansas Case Law 2006
Renny’s Bail Bond Co., Inc. v. State, 2006 WL 477633 (Ark.App. March 1, 2006) affirmed the trial court order forfeiting the bond. The defendant failed to appear and the court issued an arrest warrant. The next day the defendant was arrested for a different offense in another county, but he was released later the same day because the arrest warrant was not yet entered in the state’s warrant database. The court found that release on bond remanded the defendant to the custody of the surety, and it was up to the surety to keep track of the defendant and make sure he appeared. The State has to cooperate, but the surety cannot rely on the authorities to perform the surety’s duty. The surety did not recover the defendant and was not entitled to remission of the forfeiture.
Arkansas Case Law 2005
Hot Springs Bail Bond v. State, 206 S.W.3d 306 (Ark. App. 2005) held that the state’s failure or refusal to enter a misdemeanor warrant for the fugitive defendant in the NCIC and ACIC databases was not a ground to exonerate the bond.
In Manuel Bail Bond Company, Inc. v. State, 2005 WL 1040060 (Ark. App. April 27, 2005) the defendant failed to appear, and the bail bond company was personally served with notice of a show cause hearing. The company appeared and waived the show cause hearing and acknowledged that it had 120 days to produce the defendant. When it failed to produce him, the bond was forfeited. The bail bond company appealed on the theory that the statute required service of the notice by certified mail not by personal service. The court expressed skepticism but held that the case should be decided under the law in force at the time the forfeiture action was commenced, and the certified mail provisions was added to the statute by a later amendment. Since the applicable law did not require any notice to the surety, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed without reaching the question of how notice must be provided under the amended statute.
In Arvis Harper Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 208 S.W.3d 809 (Ark. App. 2005) the defendant failed to appear and a hearing was set for the bondsman to show cause why a judgment of bond forfeiture should not be entered. Prior to the show cause hearing, the bondsman recovered the defendant and turned him over to the Sheriff, which should have foreclosed entry of judgment. However, the bondsman did not appear at the show cause hearing or provide the clerk, the court, or the prosecutor with the receipt showing he had surrendered the defendant. The court, not being informed otherwise, entered a judgment of forfeiture. No appeal was taken, but more than 90 days later the bondsman moved to set aside the judgment, and the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals held that there was no jurisdiction to set aside the forfeiture. Under Ark. Rule of Civil Procedure 60, for 90 days a court can act to correct errors or mistakes or to prevent a miscarriage of justice. After 90 days passes, a judgment can be set aside only for fraud or misrepresentation. Since there was no fraud or misrepresentation and the bondsman did not act within the 90 day period, the trial court could not modify or vacate the judgment.
Manuel Bail Bond Company, Inc. v. State, 2005 WL 1463849 (Ark. App. June 22, 2005) reached the same result on reconsideration of the decision reported at 2005 WL 1040060. This time the Court held that service of the notice of forfeiture by certified mail was not a jurisdictional requirement and, like all questions of sufficiency of service of process could be waived by appearing in the case. In this case, the Court found such a waiver and affirmed judgment against the surety without discussing the “old” law versus “new” law issue addressed in its first reported decision.
Arkansas Case Law 2004
Renny’s Bail Bond Company v. State, 2004 WL 1987655 (Ark. App. September 8, 2004) did not reach the merits of the bail bond company’s motion to set aside a forfeiture because the motion was filed more than 90 days after entry of the forfeiture. The Court held that pursuant to Ark. Civil Rule 60, once the 90 day period expired the trial court lost the power to modify the judgment of forfeiture. [Probably not published].
Renny’s Bail Bond Co. v. State, 2004 WL 2294408 (Ark. App. October 13, 2004) held that the trial court correctly denied a motion to set aside a bond forfeiture. The motion was filed after expiration of the 90 day period in which Ark. R. Civ. Proc. 60 permits the trial court to modify or vacate a judgment. In any case, Ark. Code §16-84-201(c)(2) exonerates the surety if the defendant is apprehended within 120 days after written notice to the surety that the defendant had failed to appear, and here he was surrendered after the 120 day period expired.
Spencer Bonding Services, Inc. v. State, 200 S.W.3d 457 (Ark. App. 2004) held that the bond should not have been forfeited because a 171 day delay between the defendant’s failure to appear and sending an order to show cause to the surety was not “prompt” issuance of the order as required by Ark. Code §16-84-201(a).
Hot Springs Bail Bond v. State, 206 S.W.3d 306 (Ark. App. 2005) held that the state’s failure or refusal to enter a misdemeanor warrant for the fugitive defendant in the NCIC and ACIC databases was not a ground to exonerate the bond.
Arkansas Case Law 2003
Holt Bonding Co., Inc. v. State, 2003 WL 21418466 (Ark. App. June 18, 2003) set aside a bond forfeiture because the applicable statute, Ark. Code section 16-84-201(a)(1)(A), requires that an order directing the surety to appear and show cause why the bond should not be forfeited shall be sent by certified mail. The certified mail receipt in the court file did not have a postmark on it. The court held “the failure to ensure a proper post mark constitutes a failure to strictly comply with the requirements of section 16-84-201” and reversed the forfeiture.