New York Case Laws
Click on the below to read New York Case Laws for the following years:
2012
2011
2008
2007
2006
2003
New York Case Law 2012
In People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, Case No. 34 (N.Y. March 22, 2012) the Court reversed the Appellate Division decision reported at 909 N.Y.S.2d 357 (N.Y.A.D. 2010) and held that Criminal Procedure Law §520.10 required the court to set at least two alternative forms of bail. Subdivision (1) of the statute lists nine categories of bail including cash, an insurance company bond, a secured bond, a partially secured bond, an unsecured bond, and a credit card. Subdivision (2) then permits the court two options. The first is to set a bail amount without specifying a category (presumably leading to an unsecured bond). The second is the “court may direct that the bail be posted in any one of two or more of the forms specified in subdivision one, designated in the alternative, and may designate different amounts varying with the forms.” Thus, in this case the trial court could have said $20,000 cash or $200,000 partially secured appearance bond that required a 10% monetary deposit. The trial court could not, however, require the bond to be posted in only one of the listed forms. [Although this case involved a trial court’s attempt to require a $20,000 cash only bond, the decision would also prevent the court from requiring an insurance company bond as the only method of release.]
New York Case Law 2011
In United States v. Drivas, Case No. 10-cr-771 (E.D.N.Y. August 11, 2011) the defendant was released on a $1 million bond with conditions for home confinement and electronic monitoring. She made a series of requests to leave home for social occasions. The latest request, to attend a wedding, was denied by the Magistrate Judge. The court noted that although the Government consented to the request, there was nothing in the record that the sureties on the bond knew of the request or had consented to it. The court stated, “the defendant’s travel increases the risk to the sureties who have each risked incurring a debt of one million dollars in the event the defendant violates a condition of her release. In the absence of consent from those sureties, granting the request will leave the bond essentially unsecured, which I am unwilling to approve.”
New York Case Law 2008
In Corrales v. Walker, 2008 WL 1944226 (N.Y.Dist.Ct. April 4, 2008) the defendant appeared and was sentenced to probation. After she violated the terms of her probation, the court ordered her to appear and forfeited the bond when she did not. The bond, however, had been exonerated by operation of law when the defendant was sentenced. The surety retained counsel, had the forfeiture judgment set aside, and demanded that the indemnitor on the bond reimburse its counsel fees. When the indemnitor failed to pay, the surety had a confessed judgment entered against her, and she moved to set the confessed judgment aside. The court held that the confessed judgment clause and the indemnity agreement covered only expenses “in connection with the bond,” and the bond terminated when the defendant was sentenced. The counsel fees were not in connection with the bond, and the court set aside the confessed judgment.
New York Case Law 2007
In Seneca Insurance Co. v. People, 834 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y.A.D. 2007) the defendant was initially indicted on six counts of drug and weapons violations. The surety posted an $80,000 bond, and the defendant was released pending trial. Some eight months later, he was indicted on two additional counts of drug charges, and the court set an additional $10,000 bond, which the surety also posted, and required the surety to state that it would continue to maintain the $80,000 bond. The defendant was acquitted of the charges in the first indictment and did not appear for trial on the second indictment. The court forfeited the entire $90,000, and the surety sought remission of $80,000 on the ground that it covered only the first indictment. The court denied its request, and the surety appealed.
The Appellate Division reasoned that a bond is a contract to be interpreted according to its terms, and noted that the terms, “must be construed strictly in the surety’s favor and the surety’s obligations cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the bonds.” The $80,000 bond made no reference to the second indictment. It was unambiguous on its face and should have been enforced as written. Even if the discussion at the time of the second indictment were considered, however, it would be insufficient to modify the surety’s obligation under the first bond. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court and directed that the order of forfeiture be vacated.
New York Case Law 2006
In People v. Miller, 824 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.A.D. 2006) the defendant failed to appear and the trial court revoked his bond and issued a bench warrant. The court did not make a finding that his absence was unexcused or direct forfeiture of the bond. The state waited over three years before moving for forfeiture of the bond. In exchange for a postponement to give it time to try to locate the defendant, the surety waived any objection to timeliness of the motion. The surety did not find the defendant, and the bond was forfeited. On appeal, the Court noted the waiver agreement but also held that the 120 day period to seek enforcement of a forfeiture order runs from adjournment of the court in which a finding is made that the failure to appear was unexcused and an order of forfeiture entered.
New York Case Law 2003
In International Fidelity Insurance Co. v. City of New York, 263 F.Supp.2d 619 (E.D. N.Y. 2003) the surety challenged on constitutional grounds the practice of entering judgment of forfeiture against the surety without any prior notice to the surety. The many counts in the complaint included both specific bonds on which such judgments were entered and general challenges to the procedure. The court seemed to agree with the surety that the failure to give advance notice was a constitutional violation but nevertheless avoided ruling on the merits of the claims. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the counts of the complaint addressing specific bonds because they could have been raised in the state court by moving for relief from the judgments. The court also held that the general challenges to the procedure did not present an actual case or controversy because the entry of judgment did not deprive the surety of any constitutionally protected property right. The court, after having the case for over three years, dismissed it on jurisdiction and standing grounds without actually deciding the merits of any of the claims.